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This dissertation examines individuals’ actions to improve social outcomes when unrecoverable
investments are necessary. Situations involving non-pecuniary and pecuniary investments are
considered. In the former, the prerequisite of real effort - a non-pecuniary, unrecoverable
investment - is examined when said effort determines an individual’s ability to procure their
preferred social outcome. Theoretical predictions over an individual’s effort provision are based
on their revealed preferences for the social distribution of wealth according to the general axiom
of revealed preference (GARP). Laboratory experiments reveal that individuals’ effort provisions
do not support the assumption of stable preferences (transitivity) of wealth distribution.
Specifically, individuals who reveal a preference for egalitarian outcomes do not exert enough
real effort toward said outcomes when all of the wealth can be distributed directly to them. In the
latter, pecuniary situation, auction formats that require all bidders to pay their bid (i.e., all-pay
auctions) are studied as a way of funding public goods, specifically in the context of charity
auctions. An innovative theoretical variation of the war of attrition is designed. This variation
requires bidders to make unrecoverable upfront investments in the auction in order to
participate, and the amount of one’s investment dictates how much one can potentially bid in the
auction. In addition, an empirical analysis of this theoretical variation is provided via laboratory
experiments. These experiments seek to highlight the bidder-specific and mechanism-specific
characteristics that may lead to greater success in charitable fund-raising. The results suggest
that auction mechanisms with an incremental bidding design outperform mechanisms with a
lump-sum bidding design.
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1 Chapter 1: Putting Social Preferences to Work
Statistics on volunteering reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2013) show that
approximately 26.5% of Americans volunteer a median of 50 hours annually for non-profit
organizations. According to the Red Cross, approximately 9.5 million Americans donated blood
in 2012. Pro-social activities such as these are evidence that some individuals experience personal
benefit from social outcomes that transcend their immediate self-interest. This behavior is
economically relevant and should be incorporated into our models. The foremost method of
describing this behavior is by way of defining an individual’s preferences for social outcomes. In
particular, Andreoni (1990) outlines a social preference theory that allows individuals to have
increasing utility in the improved outcomes of others, and Andreoni and Miller (2002) provide
empirical evidence in support of this theory.
Using this framework, this chapter addresses a largely unconsidered dimension of social
behavior: the directed effort that is necessary to generate one’s preferred social outcome. In
many situations it is not enough to simply express one’s preference for social outcomes for those
outcomes to then occur, although in many experimental studies this is all that is required.
Eliciting a preference in this manner is likely an over-simplified method of understanding
pro-social behavior in many naturally-occurring situations, such as the ones exemplified above.
One way we can begin to close this gap is to incorporate a costly task that is associated with the
successful implementation of one’s social preference, whatever that preference may be. The core
question this chapter attempts to answer is: Do individuals manifest effort in a way that is
consistent with rational social preference theory? A model of effort provision is established in
conjunction with social preference theory to predict individual action toward a social outcome,
and laboratory experiments provide an empirical evaluation of this theory.
The experimental results reported in this chapter suggest that while effort provision is generally
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consistent with the theory, social outcomes are not. In particular, those who reveal relatively
pro-social preferences (maximize welfare over personal gain) fail to procure their “preferred”
outcomes too frequently, by very small margins, when the state of the world is highly inequitable
in their favor. In situations where pro-social individuals have the opportunity to eschew effort
for a large personal gain, they do so – despite this outcome having already been revealed worse
by the individual. However, similar analysis of relatively selfish individuals (maximizing
personal gain over welfare) reveals no inconsistency between their stated social preferences and
their procurement of said preferences.
Several studies in both the economic and psychology literatures have illustrated that pro-social
behavior can be a mercurial social phenomenon difficult to express in the form of an internally
consistent preference. Within a modified dictator game, Dana et al. (2007) compares dictator
choice in treatments where the receiver’s payout is known to treatments where the receiver’s
payout is not known (but may become known at no cost). When the receiver’s payout is
unknown, dictators became much more self-serving compared to when it is known.1 These
authors argue that subjects often display an illusory preference for fairness in many dictator
games, but require only the slightest opportunity to act in their self-interest for their behavior to
change.
There are several studies, including Dana et al. (2007), that suggest individuals endure
dissonance when faced with making a pro-social decision at a personal expense. In a laboratory
experiment, Lazear (2009) finds that individuals will often choose to remove themselves from the
situations that typically lead to them sharing. DellaVigna (2009) reports similar results in a field
experiment for fundraising. Specifically, when individuals are told the time the fundraisers will
visit there is a ten to twenty-five percent decrease in the number of doors opened. The behaviors
1Dana et al. (2007) has been shown to be robust by Larson and Capra (2009) and Grossman
(2010).
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in each of these studies provide support for cognitive dissonance influencing social outcomes by
motivating individuals to avoid certain information or situations, if possible, as a way of abating
the dissonance (Festinger 1957).
It may be more natural, then, to say individuals do not have “preferences” regarding social
outcomes, rather they have a “constraint” that limits their ability to act in their own self-interest.2
Rabin (1995) discusses theoretically how, in the presence of a moral constraint, individuals may
seek to relax that constraint by avoiding information or situations in a manner that is consistent
with the experiments described here.
Contrary to the notion that social preferences are illusory, the theory of ego depletion would
suggest that while individuals may have well-defined pro-social preferences they also have a
limited “mental resource” that can promote the pro-social outcome. Baumeister et al. (1998)
experimentally reveals that actively weighing the costs and benefits of one’s actions, whether
they be pro-attitudinal or counter-attitudinal, weakens one’s self-control for decisions in similar
situations in the future. However, if one’s actions do not have meaningful consequences (i.e. no
real cost/benefit analysis is required) then the ego will not deplete. Their paper draws originally
upon the structural theory of the psyche (Freud 1961), wherein the ego manages the desires of
instinctual (id) and rule-based (superego) constructs. As the ego weakens, it will naturally
acquiesce to more instinctual desires.
In the context of this chapter, it would be predicted that more selfish behavior will be observed as
one’s ego is depleted, which can be accomplished simply by (for example) asking individuals to
make several meaningful choices (i.e. that require cost/benefit analysis). Ego depletion has been
documented to reduce the likelihood of pro-social outcomes in laboratory experiments. In
2See Wilson (2010) for a broader criticism of social preference theory. This essay argues that
defining preferences over social outcomes is forcing an economic model onto situations for which
there is not enough information. In addition, experimental results in Bardsley (2008) lead us to
believe the inference of social preferences are an artifact of the experiment design.
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Achtziger et al. (2011), proposers in an ultimatum game make smaller offers under ego depletion,
and responders are more like to reject those offers under ego depletion.
The model and results reported in this chapter are important because they illuminate the effects
of a previously unconsidered component of social behavior: directed effort toward a preferred
outcome. Empirical evidence from controlled laboratory experiments suggests the effect of effort
leads to an unrectifiable inconsistency between social outcomes and social preferences in
relatively pro-social individuals. These results contradict those reported in Gneezy et al. (2012)
where costly pro-social behavior leads to consistent behavior in the future. Moreover, the
repeated nature of the experiment reveals that individuals determining social outcomes
(dictators) experience ego depletion, as they are less likely to choose pro-social outcomes through
time, while those who do not determine social outcomes (receivers) are not.
1.1 A Model of Effort Provision
A model of effort provision is established in conjunction with social preference theory to predict
individual action toward a social outcome. The model, simply stated, considers an individual
who prefers a particular social outcome over an exogenously determined outcome, which can be
thought of as the “state of the world”. Effort is costly to the individual, and the effort level
necessary to execute their preferred social outcome is known. In this setup, the individual should
only exert effort to execute their preferred outcome if the net surplus from doing so is greater
than the current benefit received from the exogenously determined state of the world while
exerting no effort. This model is then tested using binary dictator games and real effort tasks.
Consider an agent d (a dictator) who has preferences over outcomes that involve herself and
another agent r (a recipient). Assume that, first, d chooses a social outcome o∗ from a set of




Then, d exerts effort to replace the state of the world, s, with o∗. Let d and r receive a private
benefit of πsd and π
s
r , respectively, from the current state of the world.
Let the effort exerted by d in an attempt to procure o∗ instead of s be defined by ed ∈ R+. Assume
that exerting effort is costly to d, and this cost can be described by Cd(ed), with Cd(ed) being
strictly increasing. Let ẽd be the level of effort necessary to procure o∗, which is assumed to be
known by d and independent of her preferred outcome.
Let ud(π∗d, π
∗
r ) and ud(πsd, π
s
r) be the utility d receives from procuring o∗ and the state of the world,
respectively.3 In this case, d will exert effort equal to ẽd if ud(π∗d, π
∗
r )− Cd(ẽd) ≥ ud(πsd, πsr),
otherwise she will not exert any effort and receive ud(πsd, π
s




ẽd if ud(π∗d, π
∗
r )− Cd(ẽd) ≥ ud(πsd, πsr)
0 else.
(1.1)
This model of effort provision predicts that d is more likely to exert effort for outcome o∗ as it
becomes increasingly more valuable than outcome s. In this chapter, this model will be applied
to a two person binary dictator game setting to test if effort is being exerted by d in a manner that
is consistent with her revealed social preferences. Revealed preference theory is used as the
measure of consistency, which gives specific predictions regarding an individual’s preference for
one outcome over another. As described in this model, these predictions over preferences can be
extended to the predictions of effort provision to procure one outcome over another.
As a methodological example, suppose d plays a binary dictator game and may choose a social
outcome from the set {Altruistic, Selfish} = {(5, 5), (7, 3)}, where (5, 5) means d and r each
3I will model an individual’s utility as ud(πd, πr), even though for agents with no social prefer-
ence it may be parsimoniously modeled by only their own payout ud(πd).
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(9, 0) Very Selfish
(4, 2)
Worse





(9, 0) Very Selfish
(4, 2)
Worse
(b) Outcomes revealed worse if (7, 3)  (5, 5)
Shaded areas represent outcomes that are revealed worse based on the dictator’s revealed prefer-
ence in the dictator game. In panel (a) the shaded outcomes are revealed worse than (7, 3), while
in panel (b) the shaded outcomes are revealed worse than (5, 5).
receive a payout of 5, and (7, 3) means d receives a payout of 7 and r receives a payout of 3. If d
chooses (5, 5), then (5, 5) is weakly directly revealed preferred to (7, 3), i.e. ud(5, 5) ≥ ud(7, 3).
Given standard assumptions associated with well-behaved utility functions this also tells us
more about where her indifference curve may fall for (7, 3). The shaded areas in Figure 1-1
describe the outcomes that are revealed worse than the social outcome not chosen by d.
Using the model on effort provision and a binary dictator game, predictions can be made on the
outcomes for which individuals would be willing to exert more (or less) effort. For instance,
suppose for a particular individual that the outcome (5, 5) is weakly directly revealed preferred
to (7, 3). In this case, Figure 1-1(a) illustrates two outcomes that are revealed worse than the
outcome (7, 3). These outcomes are (4, 2) (Worse) and (9, 0) (Very Selfish). In this case, then it is
predicted that this individual is more likely to exert effort to manifest (5, 5) when the state of the
world is (4, 2) or (9, 0) than when the state of the world is (7, 3). This is the basis of Hypothesis 1a
and Hypothesis 1b.
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Hypothesis 1a: Dictators who reveal a preference for the outcome Altruistic in a binary dictator game
will exert the effort needed to procure this outcome more often when the state of the world is Very Selfish
than when the state of the world is Selfish.
Hypothesis 1b: Dictators who reveal a preference for the outcome Altruistic in a binary dictator game
will exert the effort needed to procure this outcome more often when the state of the world is Worse than
when the state of the world is Selfish.
If, instead, the outcome (7, 3) is weakly directly revealed preferred to (5, 5), then Figure 1-1(b)
illustrates that only one of these outcomes is revealed worse to (5, 5), which is (4, 2) (Worse). This
means for individuals with well-behaved utility functions who demonstrate Selfish  Altruistic
that we can also infer Altruistic Worse. However, we cannot infer this about the outcome Very
Selfish; Figure 1-1(b) illustrates that this outcome could conceivably be above or below this
individual’s indifference curve running through Altruistic. As a result, the effort provision model
can only make one prediction: when Selfish is weakly directly revealed preferred to Altruistic,
then this individual is more likely to exert effort to manifest the outcome Selfish when the state of
the world is Worse than when it is Altruistic. This is the basis of Hypothesis 2.
Hypothesis 2: Dictators who reveal a preference for the outcome Selfish in a binary dictator game will
exert the effort needed to procure this outcome more often when the state of the world is Worse than when
the state of the world is Altruistic.
Note, it is important that effort provision from d is not compared across different revealed
preferences in the binary dictator game (Altruistic vs. Selfish). Because the predictions of this
model are restricted by d’s revealed preferences in the binary dictator game, this means that the
effort provision of dictators who reveal a preference for the outcome Selfish cannot be compared
to the effort provision of dictators who reveal a preference for the outcome Altruistic.
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1.2 Experiment Design
62 undergraduates from a large university volunteered to participate in an experiment that lasted
approximately 50 minutes. They were brought into the laboratory on campus in groups that
ranged from 10 to 14 in size where they sat at partitioned computer workstations to ensure
private decision-making. Subjects were given computerized instructions and a series of binary
dictator games including real effort provision tasks with the use of z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007).4
The instructions included a practice period and multiple opportunities to ask questions. During
the instructions, subjects were randomly assigned a role for the entire experiment. Half of the
subjects were assigned Role A (the dictator) while the other half were assigned to Role B (the
receiver). To best test the hypotheses stated in Section 2, all subjects were told those in Role A
would be making real payout decisions for themselves and a random individual in Role B while
those in Role B would be making hypothetical decisions. This setup explicitly eliminates the
possibility of reciprocity or tacit collusion that may otherwise exist.5
The instructions explained that the experiment consisted of several periods, each of which had
three parts. For every period the experiment proceeded as follows:
Part I: Both Role A and Role B were asked privately to choose the option they
preferred from a randomly selected binary dictator game.
Part II: Role A was presented with a randomly assigned alternative (state of the
world) to the option she chose in Part I.
Part III: Role A completed a counting task where successfully completing the
4The instructions administered during the experiment can be found in the appendix.
5An alternative setup would have been to have all subjects play as the dictator while knowing
that there was a 50% chance that their role would be reversed to the receiver at the end of the ex-
periment. Although this setup would have allowed for more observations, it would likely distort
behavior if subjects received utility from selecting an altruistic choice even if by chance that choice
did not affect the outcome.
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counting task would allow Role A to keep her choice from Part I, and not successfully
completing the counting task would cause her choice in Part I to be replaced with the
random assigned alternative from Part II.
Both roles were informed that Role B would not be told the choices Role A made in the dictator
game nor the outcome of the effort task at any point. They were also told the computer would
randomly choose one period for each subject in Role A to determine the payouts for the
experiment. This procedure is designed to minimize the possibility of any wealth effects or
concern about meta-game analysis. Once the twenty periods were completed subjects were paid
privately, including an additional five dollars for participating, and left the lab. On average,
subjects were paid $14.40, including the participation payment.
1.2.1 The Dictator Games and the Effort Task
Each binary dictator game consisted of two potential payout bundles {(πd, πr), (π′d, π′r)}. The
bundles in each game were designed such that πd > π′d ≥ π′r > πr and π′d + π′r > πd + πr. This
means that the bundle (πd, πr) allocates relatively more money to the dictator and relatively less
money to the receiver than bundle (π′d, π
′
r) does. It also means that (πd, πr) is a welfare inefficient
option. There were 20 different binary different dictator games in total, each of which are listed in
Table 1.1(a). They are labeled “Altruistic” and “Selfish” in a manner that is consistent with the
configuration of Figure 1-1.6 In choosing these binary dictator games, much consideration was
given to ensure there was a salient monetary difference between the two options to avoid
dictators from being indifferent. Moreover, it was equally important that the set of random states
of the world did not “bunch” together with respect to allocations either, leading the dictator to be
relatively indifferent between the possible outcomes.
6The labels “Altruistic” and “Selfish” were not used in the experiment.
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In the case that a dictator chooses the Altruistic option she would typically lose only a few
dollars to give the receiver three or four in return. For each game, subjects were shown the two
payout bundles Altruistic and Selfish on the computer as Option A and Option B, and they were
asked to click the option they preferred. Those in Role A were reminded that their decision
would determine the payouts to themselves and an individual in Role B. Those in Role B were
reminded that their decisions were hypothetical. Each subject played the dictator games in
random order to avoid ordering effects.
Table 1.1: Dictator Games (a) and Potential States of the World (b)


























Potential States of the World
Altruistic Selfish Very Selfish Worse
(9,7) (10,4) (11,0) (8,3)
(11,11) (12,6) (13,0) (10,5)
(11,9) (12,5) (13,0) (10,4)
(12,11) (13,6) (14,0) (11,5)
(10,10) (13,3) (14,0) (9,2)
(13,10) (14,6) (15,0) (12,5)
(11,11) (14,4) (15.5,0) (10,3)
(12,8) (14,3) (15,0) (11,2)
(11,9) (14,3) (15,0) (10,2)
(14,7) (15,4) (16,0) (13,3)
(12,9) (15,3) (16,0) (11,2)
(13,8) (15,3) (16,0) (12,2)
(15,9) (16,5) (17,0) (14,4)
(16,9) (17,5) (18,0) (15,4)
(15,8) (17,4) (18.5,0) (14,3)
(15,8) (17,3) (18,0) (14,2)
(17,8) (18,5) (19.5,0) (16,4)
(16,8) (18,3) (19,0) (15,2)
(17,10) (19,4) (20,0) (16,3)
(18,9) (20,5) (22,0) (17,4)
(b)
Dictators first choose a preferred outcome for a dictator a given dictator game from (a). Then, one
of the four states of the world (b) is independently and randomly revealed. Dictator games and
potential states of the world are paired by row.
After having made their decision in the dictator game, subjects in Role A were shown the option
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they chose and a “Random Alternative” (state of the world). The potential states of the world are
listed in Table 1.1(b), which were paired to the binary dictator game options in the same row.
Refer to Figure 1-1 for a visual representation of the placements of these potential states of the
world.
For convenience, the dictator who, for a given period, prefers the relatively pro-social outcome,
Altruistic, will often be referred to as an “altruistic dictator,” and the dictator who, for a given
period, prefers the outcome Selfish will often be referred to as a “selfish dictator”. The states of
the world for each game were chosen such that two of the four were the options in the dictator
game (Altruistic and Selfish); one state of the world was selected to fall only within the revealed
worse convex hull of the altruistic dictator (Very Selfish); and one state of the world was selected
to fall within the intersection of both altruistic and selfish dictators’ revealed worse convex hulls
(Worse). The state of the world was chosen randomly among these four, independent of the
dictator’s preference. This aspects of the design is critical to the incentive compatibility of
dictators to truthfully reveal their preference in the binary dictator game. Because the potential
state of the world is independent of the dictator’s choice in the dictator game, the dictator has no
incentive to misrepresent her preferences. If the potential states of the world were somehow
conditional on the dictators’ choices then they may no longer have an incentive to choose their
true preferences in the dictator game.
It is also important to note that the necessary cost of effort is independent of the dictator’s choice
(i.e. effort tasks are not systematically easier or harder to complete given their preference in the
dictator game). If, randomly, the dictator’s choice and the state of the world were identical (e.g.
the dictator chose the outcome Altruistic and the random state of the world was also the outcome
Altruistic), then effort provision cannot change the outcome. In this case, the dictator’s optimal
effort provision is zero.
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After being shown their choice from the dictator game and the state of the world, those in Role A
completed an effort provision task that would allow them to keep their choice from the dictator
game. This task consisted of counting how many numbers (0-9) there were in a series of 120
random characters that included both digits (0-9) and letters (A-Z). Each of the 120 characters
was equally likely to be one of the 36 alphanumeric characters. Role A was given ninety seconds
to complete this task and report their answer to the computer. If Role A was correct or had a
margin of error of one she kept the option she chose from the dictator game, otherwise she and
her receiver were assigned the state of the world that was shown to them. Table 1.2 shows an
example of the effort task completed in this experiment.7
Table 1.2: Effort Task Example
8 3 P 2 M 9 L K V 5 W 9 G 5 2 X M E G P
6 E Y R 4 D S S 9 L V X 3 Q S M O H B A
R 9 Y Y P 2 4 A V 0 D R L Z X 8 3 A L J
7 Q 7 M I 2 D Z V 6 W Z U P L 2 G P Q J
F N N L Y J N N G D X J L Q 7 5 4 T F Q
V R H R D 8 R 0 7 C G P P X 3 L C X 9 0
This task was selected for measuring effort for several reasons. First, it is important that subjects
do not vary significantly in ability. Second, because letters and numbers appear randomly it is
truly cognitively taxing for subjects to track how many numbers have appeared while paying
close enough attention to distinguish between 0s and Os, ls and 1s, et cetera. Finally, to be in
accordance with the theory, it is important that subjects have a good idea of how much effort it
will take for them to complete the task successfully. While the absolute number of numbers may
vary from task to task this does not change the fact that the subject must still verify whether a
given alphanumeric character is either a letter or a number. In this sense, the necessary effort
provision is essentially constant.
7This example has 32 numbers in it. If Role A reported 31, 32, or 33 then she would keep the




In this study 31 dictators (Role A) and 31 receivers (Role B) each participated in 20 dictator games,
and dictators also completed an effort provision task after each dictator game. Since dictators
made decisions for real outcomes and receivers made decisions for hypothetical outcomes, for
the analysis of monetary payoffs there were 620 observations. Dictators chose the option Selfish
in the dictator game 71% of the time while receivers chose the option Selfish in the (hypothetical)
dictator game 33% of the time. While the amount of selfish behavior by subjects making salient
decisions sounds high, this option still allocated almost 22% of the payment to the receiver on
average. 71% of dictators chose the option Altruistic in at least one of the twenty dictator games.
Dictators typically chose the option Altruistic more often when the gain to the receiver was
relatively large compared to the decrease in their own payout, which is consistent with Andreoni
and Miller (2002). This is the trade off measured by the ratio of exchange in payout from the
dictator to the receiver, or the (negative) slope of a “budget constraint” through the two bundles.
When the difference between the two bundles in the dictator game was such that dictators could
give up one dollar for themselves to give their receivers an additional two dollars (or something
proportionate to that), dictators chose the altruistic bundle approximately 22% of the time. When
the difference between the two bundles was such that dictators could give up one dollar for
themselves to give their receivers an additional five dollars (or something proportionate to that),
dictators chose the altruistic option 48% of the time.
Table 1.3 reports the marginal effects of a random effects probit on the chosen option made in the
dictator game by dictators and (hypothetically by) receivers. Choice is a binary variable, where a
1 is having chosen the option Selfish and 0 is having chosen the option Altruistic. Rate of
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Exchange is the (negative) slope of the budget constraint on which the two options in the dictator




. Period is the period
(1-20) that the dictator game appeared to that particular dictator. ∆ in Own Payout is the exact
personal monetary gain to the dictator from choosing the option Selfish (πd − π′d). ∆ in Total
Payout is the welfare gain from the dictator choosing the option Altruistic [(π′d + π
′
r)− (πd + πr)].
There is no multicollinearity present in the variables in Table 1.3.
Dictators and receivers both chose the option Altruistic more frequently as the benefit to the
receiver increased. In this sense, receivers may be biased in how often they would choose the
option Altruistic for real stakes, but respond to the “cost of sharing” in a very similar way to
dictators. Dictators chose the option Selfish more often through time, while receivers did not.
This result is very relevant to the consideration of ego depletion in the next sub-section. Since
receivers did not complete the effort task and their choices did not vary significantly over time,
this suggests that an individual’s willingness to pursue a pro-social outcome may decrease over
time when it requires effort.
1.3.2 Effort Task
Recall that the effort task in this experiment is to review 120 random alphanumeric characters
and report to the computer how many numbers (0-9) there are. This was a task performed only
by dictators. After choosing an option in the dictator game (Altruistic or Selfish), dictators were
randomly assigned a state of the world (Altruistic, Selfish, Very Selfish, or Worse). At this point,
dictators completed the effort task to replace the state of the world with their preference from the
dictator game.
Overall, approximately 70% of the time (i.e. in 431 out of 620 effort tasks) dictators reported the
correct number of digits exactly. Figure 1-2 describes the distribution of actual and reported
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Table 1.3: Random Effects Probit of Subject Choice in Dictator Game
Dependent Variable: Choice in Dictator Game (1=Selfish)
Dictators (Real Stakes) Receivers (Hypothetical Stakes)
Period 0.05∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Rate of Exchange 0.55∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.00
(0.088) (0.125) (0.13) (0.08) (0.13) (0.30)
∆ in Own Payout 0.16 0.15 0.18 0.56
(0.16) (0.16) (0.14) (0.35)
∆ in Total Payout 0.01 -0.31
(0.028) (0.25)
Observations 620 620 620 620 620 620
Notes: marginal effects are reported. Standard errors are in parentheses.
∗,∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
numbers in the effort task. The distribution of actual numbers are represented by gray bars and
the distribution of reported numbers are represented by white bars. This comparison
demonstrates that there was little evidence of pure shirking in the task; many subjects exerted
some effort on the task, and if they did not report correctly they often under-reported.
In analyzing the performance of dictators in the effort task, this chapter proceeds in two ways.
The first analysis asks what the average error is for a given revealed preference from the dictator
game (selfish or altruistic) in the presence of a randomly selected “state of the world”. For a true
number of digits ñ and a reported number of digits nd, error is defined as |ñ− nd|. The second
asks what the failure rate is for procuring a given revealed preference in the presence of a
randomly selected state of the world. As per the experimental instructions, a failure is defined as
|ñ− nd| ≥ 2. Both of these measures are reported in this sub-section for altruistic and selfish
dictators, respectively. Without separating dictators by revealed preference, according to average
error 42% of subjects were inconsistent in at least one of the three tested hypotheses.
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Figure 1-2: Histograms of Actual Vs Reported Numbers in Effort Task






















Actual numbers are gray and reported numbers are white.
Alternatively, according to failure rates 57% of subjects were inconsistent in at least one of the
three tested hypotheses.
Altruistic Dictators
Table 1.4 reports the results of four random effects estimates on altruistic dictators - those
dictators who, for a particular period, revealed a preference for the option Altruistic over the
option Selfish in the dictator game. The two leftmost specifications are random effects probit
models on the variable Fail, which is a binary variable that is equal to 1 if the altruistic dictator
failed the effort task and is equal to 0 if the she was successful. Marginal effects are reported for
two estimates of this model. The two rightmost specifications are random effects generalized
least squares estimates of the size of the error in the effort task in absolute value. Errors in this
task are reported in absolute value, since the dictator could either over- or under-report relative
to the correct answer. The independent variables used to estimate these models are dummy
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variables that represent which state of the world was randomly assigned to the dictator. The
period in which the dictator played this dictator game is represented by the variable Period, and
the random realization of how many numbers that they needed to report to the computer is
represented by the variable Numbers.
For altruistic dictators, Very Selfish represents the state of the world that is revealed worse than
the option Selfish from the dictator game (See Figure 1-1). The predictions from the model are
that dictators will execute their preferred social outcome more often if the state of the world is
Very Selfish than if the state of the world is Selfish (Hypothesis 1a). The results reported in Table
1.4 do not support Hypothesis 1a, which show that altruistic dictators fail the effort task more
often if the state of the world is Very Selfish than when the state of the world is Selfish.
Result 1a: Contradictory to theoretical predictions, dictators who revealed a preference for the outcome
Altruistic in the dictator game and received the random state of the world Very Selfish failed the effort task
more often on average than dictators who revealed a preference for the outcome Altruistic in the dictator
game and received the random state of the world Selfish.
The GLS estimates on absolute error show that average error by an altruistic dictator in the effort
task is less on average when the state of the world is Very Selfish than when the state of the
world is Selfish. This result, when compared to the failure rate of dictators, is difficult to explain.
Why would dictators come closer to reporting the correct number while also failing the task more
often? The outcome Very Selfish always offers a larger personal payout than the option Selfish
does. One possible explanation for Result 1a is that dictators are deliberately misrepresenting the
solution to the effort task by small amounts; this allows them to maintain a well intentioned
self-image while receiving a larger personal payout. Figure 1-3(a) provides graphical support for
this interpretation. This figure reports the kernel-weighted local polynomial smoothing CDFs of
effort task errors by various states of the world, separated by the dictator’s revealed preference
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(panel (a) for altruistic dictators). A strong result for rational preferences would be to see the
CDF of errors for the state of the world Selfish first-order stochastically dominate the CDF of
errors for the state of the world Very Selfish. While for the bulk of the density this is true, we find
that many of the errors associated with the state of the world Very Selfish are very small, which
eliminates the first-order stochastic dominance. A two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test of
the CDFs in panel (a) reveal that the distributions are not drawn from different distributions,
(p<0.977) for Selfish=Very Selfish and (p<0.952) for Selfish=Worse.
Table 1.4: Random Effects Estimates of Altruistic Dictator Decisions in the Effort Task
Model: Probit GLS






Altruistic 0.33∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 6.43∗∗∗ 6.56∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.10) (1.61) (1.57)
Selfish 0.16 0.16 2.58 2.61∗
(0.10) (0.10) (1.61) (1.58)
Very Selfish 0.20∗∗ 0.20∗∗ 0.95 1.02
(0.10) (0.10) (1.70) (1.67)
Constant (Worse) -0.59 1.63
(4.08) (1.78)
Observations 182 182 182 182
Notes: standard errors are in parentheses. ∗,∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Although the data do not support Hypothesis 1a, the results in Table 1.4 support Hypothesis 1b.
When altruistic dictators were randomly assigned the state of the world Worse they failed the
effort task less often on average than when the state of the world was Selfish.
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Result 1b: Dictators who revealed a preference for the outcome Altruistic in the dictator game and
received the random state of the world Worse failed the effort task less often on average than dictators who
revealed a preference for the outcome Altruistic in the dictator game and received the random state of the
world Selfish.
The state of the world Worse is inferior compared to the outcome Selfish for all dictators by the
model in Section 2; the outcome Worse always offers a smaller payout for both the dictator and
the receiver. As the results in Table 1.4 show, both the failure rate and the average error in the
effort task for this state of the world are less than for the other states of the world (as noted by all
positive coefficients), suggesting this outcome indeed is generally regarded as the most inferior.
Altruistic dictators occasionally received the random state of the world Altruistic, which was
identical to their choice in the dictator game. In these cases, Table 1.4 demonstrates that altruistic
dictators failed the effort task most often. This result suggests that dictators did not enjoy doing
the effort task (i.e. they found the task costly), and that they understood what was at stake for
their effort provision.
Selfish Dictators
For selfish dictators - those who, for a given period, revealed a preference for the option Selfish
over the option Altruistic - the state of the world Worse is theoretically predicted to be an inferior
outcome relative to the outcome Altruistic. According to the model in this chapter, this should
lead to fewer failures in the effort task on average when the state of the world is Worse than
when it is Altruistic. This is the result that is reported in Table 1.5, which provides the same
analysis as Table 1.4, except for selfish dictators. The marginal effects of the variable Altruistic are
positive in both estimates, showing that subjects on average failed the effort task more often
when the random state of the world was Altruistic than when it was Worse. These analyses
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provide support for Hypothesis 2. The average error by selfish dictators is larger when the state
of the world is Altruistic. The state of the world that was most often failed, and by the largest
margin, was the state of the world Very Selfish, which allocated nothing to the receiver. This
suggests many selfish dictators had no social preference whatsoever.
Result 2: Dictators who revealed a preference for the outcome Selfish in the dictator game and received the
random state of the world Worse failed the effort task less often on average than dictators who revealed a
preference for the outcome Selfish in the dictator game and received the random state of the world
Altruistic.
For graphical verification of this result, Figure 1-3(b) provides a non-parametric description of
the distributions of errors in the relevant effort tasks. This figure (in panel a) demonstrates that
the CDF of errors for selfish dictators that is associated with the state of the world Altruistic
first-order stochastically dominates the CDF of errors associated with the state of the world
Worse. This is strong evidence that selfish dictators manifest effort in a rational manner. The
two-sample KS test of these distributions are not statistically different (p<0.45). For comparative
purposes, the CDF of errors associated with the state of the world Very Selfish is included in
panel (b) of this figure. While some selfish dictators chose to exert effort to avoid the outcome
Very Selfish (less than 50%), many had rather large errors relative to the other states of the world.
This distribution is statistically different from the others in panel (b) according to the two-sample
KS test (p<0.00).
An Alternate Measure of Effort
Another way to approximate the effort exerted by dictators is to consider how long they spent
completing the effort task for each state of the world. Table 1.6 reports these results. Both selfish
and altruistic dictators spent the most time on average completing the effort task when the state
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Table 1.5: Random Effects Estimates of Selfish Dictator Decisions in the Effort Task
Model: Probit GLS






Altruistic 0.03 0.03 0.60 0.58
(0.06) (0.06) (0.93) (0.93)
Selfish 0.13∗∗ 0.13∗∗ 1.45 1.41
(0.05) (0.05) (0.89) (0.89)
Very Selfish 0.32∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 8.09∗∗∗ 8.11∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.87) (0.87)
Constant (Worse) 0.15 0.09
(2.25) (0.71)
Observations 438 438 438 438
Notes: standard errors are in parentheses. ∗,∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
of the world was Worse. Both also spent less time on the effort task as the experiment proceeded.
Altruistic dictators spent less time completing the effort task when the random state of the world
was Very Selfish, averaging 42.52 seconds, than when the state of the world was Selfish,
averaging 39.34 seconds. This result suggests that altruistic dictators did exert more effort when
the state of the world was Very Selfish than when the state of the world was Selfish. Moreover,
altruistic dictators spent significantly more time on the effort task when the state of the world
was Worse than when it was Selfish, which also suggests that these dictators exerted more effort
to avoid Worse than to avoid Selfish.
Selfish dictators spent 50.53 seconds on average on the effort task when the random state of the
world was Worse. They spent significantly less time on the effort task when the state of the world
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was Very Selfish (32.81 seconds on average). Unlike altruistic dictators, selfish dictators spent
statistically significantly more time on the effort task as the amount of numbers they needed to
count increased.
Alternative Theories: Ego Depletion and Cognitive Dissonance
The incompatibility of experimental results with Hypothesis 1a motivates the exploration of
alternative theories to the rational social preference model. In particular, the results of similar
experiments, which were discussed in the introduction of this chapter, leads to the natural
consideration of ego depletion and cognitive dissonance as possible explanations for observed
behavior. This section seeks to provide predictions to the question: How will dictators choose
preferred social outcomes (in the dictator game) in the presence of ego depletion or cognitive
dissonance when effort provision is needed to procure that outcome? The effects of ego depletion
and cognitive dissonance lead to diverging predictions with respect the question posed.
Suppose that a dictator has preferences over social outcomes, but she sometimes also feels
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Table 1.6: Random Effects GLS of Time Completing Effort Task
Dependent Variable: Time Completing Effort Task (in seconds)





Altruistic -2.27 -1.80 -12.59∗∗∗ -12.41∗∗∗
(2.28) (2.41) (3.29) (3.39)
Selfish -8.47∗∗∗ -7.80∗∗∗ -7.31∗∗ -7.17∗∗
(2.17) (2.29) (3.29) (3.40)
Very Selfish -17.56∗∗∗ -17.72∗∗∗ -4.21 -3.99
(2.13) (2.25) (3.48) (3.59)
Constant (Worse) 50.00∗∗∗ 50.53∗∗∗ 53.63∗∗∗ 46.51∗∗∗
(6.14) (3.22) (8.63) (4.09)
Observations 438 438 182 182
Notes: standard errors are in parentheses. ∗,∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
constrained (e.g. morally or socially) to be more altruistic than these preferences prescribe.
Assume further that this binding constraint creates dissonance in the dictator. The theory of
cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957) states she will seek to reduce said dissonance, which may
include avoiding situations and information that lead to its presence. It is arguable, then, that this
dictator may misrepresent her preferences in the dictator game by being too altruistic, and use
the effort task as a way of alleviating the dissonance. For this dictator, the effort task may allow
her to display the semblance of altruism while also procuring the outcome she truly preferred by
failing the task, thereby following a “path of least dissonance”. As a result, it would be predicted
that this dictator will choose relatively altruistic options in the dictator game but fail the effort
task - perhaps by a small margin - when the state of the world yields payouts more in line with
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their preferences (i.e. relatively selfish outcomes). Moreover, there is no a priori reason to believe
this dissonance would abate over time, so the dictator would always be motivated to employ this
strategy.
Instead, suppose that a dictator has pro-social preferences over social outcomes, but her capacity
to promote those preferences is finite, as defined by the theory of ego depletion (cf. Baumeister et
al. 1998). According to this theory, one method of depleting the ego is by engaging individuals in
meaningful decision-making (i.e. where costs and benefits must be weighed). Regardless of
whether the individual’s decision is pro-attitudinal or counter-attitudinal, this act should make it
more difficult to make controlled decisions in the future. When deciding social outcomes, a
dictator whose ego is depleted will find it difficult to inhibit themselves from choosing relatively
selfish outcomes. As a result, it is arguable that ego depletion will lead to dictators choosing
relatively more selfish options in the dictator game as the experiment progresses. Alternatively, if
the dictator were asked to make similar decisions over social outcomes but those decisions
would not be implemented, and therefore had no real meaning, then there would be no depletion
of the ego. As a result, there should be no trend associated to the dictator’s revealed preferences
through time.
While cognitive dissonance does not predict that dictators “drift” in their revealed preferences
through time, the theory of ego depletion does. Table 1.3 reveals that dictators, indeed, tend to
choose the more selfish option through time, as denoted by the statistically significant coefficient
on the variable Period. Moreover, ego depletion states this trend is the result of repeatedly
making meaningful decisions. Those in the role of receiver were also asked to make the same
allocation decisions in the dictator game, but for hypothetical stakes. Table 1.3 provides support
for ego depletion once again with the absence of any time trend in their revealed preferences. The
data available from this experiment make inferences over cognitive dissonance difficult, however
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certain modifications could be made for future studies, such as developing a treatment wherein
dictators may easily verify they have successfully completed the effort task before it is over.
1.4 Conclusion
The predominant method among economists of analyzing pro-social behavior is to assume that
individuals have preferences over social outcomes. This preference mapping leads to predictions
of stability and internal consistency that correspond to rational pro-social behavior. Studies such
as Andreoni and Miller (2002) demonstrate that a preponderance of individuals reveal rational
pro-social preferences according to the general axiom of revealed preference (GARP). Other
studies such as Dana et al. (2007) suggest that the rationality of pro-social behavior sits on a
knife’s edge, which can be drastically altered by small, contextual changes in an experiment.
In the naturally-occurring world, there are many situations in which an individual cannot simply
impose their preferences onto a situation for them to then exist; often they must exert
unobservable effort to execute their preferences. This chapter addresses this aspect of pro-social
behavior by appending a real effort task to a binary dictator game. A model of effort provision is
used to predict effort provision that is consistent with social preference theory. The results of the
experiment suggest that individuals with relatively pro-social preferences do not manifest social
outcomes in manner that is consistent with their stated preferences. This inconsistency arises
when a large personal gain is the status-quo and can be maintained with no effort provision.
Similar measures of consistency are measured for individuals with relatively selfish preferences,
which find no inconsistency according to the same model.
The results of this chapter add to a growing literature that suggests pro-social behavior requires
the consideration of many non-economic factors, and that several psychological factors may be
routinely at play. A discussion of the effects that ego depletion and cognitive dissonance may
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have on individual behavior is provided for this experiment. Individuals tend to reveal relatively
selfish preferences through time when the stakes are real but exhibit no change in revealed
preferences through time when the stakes are hypothetical. This result is consistent with the
theory of ego depletion.
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2 Chapter 2: Wars of Attrition with Unrecoverable Upfront Investments
Originally introduced by biologists to describe animal conflicts (Smith 1974), the war of attrition
has grabbed the attention of economists as a way to describe many manifestations of competitive
behavior. In general, the war of attrition models n contestants vying for k < n indivisible prizes.
It is assumed that contestants must make unrecoverable investments through time until they
choose to exit the contest, and the prizes are awarded to the k contestants who are willing to stay
in the contest the longest.
The variety of applications for the war of attrition is impressive. While suitable for modeling
fighting among fiddler crabs (Morrell et al. 2005), it is equally suited for modeling
macroeconomic stabilization (Alesina and Drazen 1991). Economists have gleamed theoretical
insights from this model in markets facing decreasing net present value (Ghemawat and
Nalebuff 1985, 1990; Fudenberg and Tirole 1986), labor strikes (Kennan and Wilson 1989), patent
races (Leininger 1991), political lobbying (Dekel et al. 2008, 2009) and terrorist activities
(Sánchez-Cuenca 2004).
This chapter presents a theoretical variation of the war of attrition where contestants must make
fully, partially or non-recoverable upfront investments to participate in the contest, and these
investments also dictate for how long a contestant may potentially compete. In particular, this
chapter considers pre-calculated wars of attrition where contestants understand that there will be
a contest and have planned strategically for the conflict. The planning stage allows contestants to
decide the amount of resources (i.e. endowment) they are willing to commit to the conflict.
Contestants then decide for how long they are willing to compete given their resources. The
duration of the contest is determined by how easily unused resources from the contest can be
re-purposed (e.g., for future contests). This design can be applied in many economic areas,
including firms’ production strategies in declining markets when their product is, to varying
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degrees, an imperfect substitute in other markets.
2.1 Literature Review
Due to its broad appeal, a vast literature has developed with respect to wars of attrition since its
original formulation in Smith (1974). This initial application was with respect to animal conflicts,
and how these conflicts may or may not be avoided. Here, the war of attrition assumed there
were two animals fighting for a single prize, which could be for territory, food or mating rights.
Typically, an apparent asymmetry between the two animals’ ability to compete allowed for
costless determination of the victor (the relatively strong contestant). This was first defined as the
handicap principle in Zahavi (1975, 1977), which states that costly signals can help minimize
animal conflicts. On the other hand, when there is no salient asymmetry between the contestants
the conflict can result in costly investments to determine the winner. In an important early
contribution, Riley (1980) provided a “strong evolutionary equilibrium” in the war of attrition,
essentially demonstrating there is a continuum of equilibria upon which contestants can
coordinate. This result relies upon the assumption that the cost of fighting is common knowledge.
Several papers consider situations where there is asymmetry in the value of the prize to the
contestants, which is public knowledge, such as Smith and Parker (1976) and Hammerstein and
Parker (1982). These papers demonstrate that the stronger contestant (defined as the one with a
higher value if costs are equal) tends to win uncontested, as well as validate that if there is no
heterogeneity among the contestants then there are no asymmetric equilibria. If, instead, the
identities of valuations are unknown then the continuum of asymmetric equilibria is maintained
and a “pecking order” emerges among the contestants (Nalebuff and Riley 1983). Here, contests
often resolve with one very aggressive contestant and one very passive contestant. However, it is
possible (though still improbable) for those lower in the pecking order to make serious
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challenges. More recently, Myatt (2005) looks at asymmetric wars of attrition where contestants
have different distributions from which they draw their private values. Contestants’ “stochastic
strengths” are compared based on these distributions, where a contestant is stochastically strong
if she has a larger ex ante valuation - even if her realization ex post is smaller. The standard design
is modified by, for example, setting a time limit (then a winner is picked randomly). Myatt (2005)
shows that the stochastically weaker contestant exits instantaneously.
Economists began employing the war of attrition by applying it to firms exiting markets with
declining future values. This addition to the literature began to balance out the more dominant
consideration of strategic market entry. Beginning with Ghermawat and Nalebuff (1985), it was
assumed that a potentially heterogeneous duopoly resulted in negative firm profits, but a
monopoly was sustainable. In their paper, it was further assumed that production was rigid,
leading firms to exit in an “all-or-nothing” manner. This led to the prediction that the biggest
firms in the market will, in expectation, exit first. The somewhat unrealistic assumption placed
on firms’ all-or-nothing strategy for production was relaxed in Whinston (1988), where firms
instead had multiple plants allowing for down shifts in production. That paper corroborated the
original prediction that larger multi-plant operations exit the declining market first. In a third
paper, Ghemawat and Nalebuff (1990), the production assumption was relaxed further, allowing
for firms to continually adjust the production levels. The results of their theoretical model predict
that relatively large firms will shrink to the sizes of their (formerly) smaller rivals.
In a slightly different context, Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) offers a theory of exiting in an
unsustainable duopoly. The model is largely based on differing fixed or opportunity costs, which
are private knowledge to the firms. In their model, the only strategic variable for firms is the time
of exit, the last of which receives monopoly profits. Finally, to generate a unique equilibrium it is
also assumed that firms could potentially compete forever - which is justified by suggesting that
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the market may at some point be able to sustain the current duopoly. This model of firm exit was
directly tested by Oprea et al. (2013), where it is reported that firm exits are efficient (76% of the
time higher cost firms exit first) and very closely resemble the point predictions of the model. It is
further reported that there is little difference in strategies when payoffs are framed as losses or
gains.
Almost simultaneously, applications for the war of attrition were being fashioned within firms’
research and development (R&D) strategies. In a very interesting first take, Harris and Vickers
(1985) model two contestants seeking to claim an indivisible prize. The prize is awarded to the
contestant to reach the “finish line” first (i.e. to complete some task first), which involves several
stages of making unrecoverable investments. In their model, it is shown that the winner behaves
exactly as if she was the only contestant. Moreover, it is shown that another contestant has the
potential to impact the winner’s behavior in the first stage of the game only, and not thereafter.
Building from this base, Leininger (1991) models a patent race using a dynamic, turn-based
all-pay auction. Here, only by outbidding one’s opponent can one remain in the race. Because
that paper abstracts from discounting payouts through time, the characterization of equilibrium
becomes quite complicated.
It is easy to envision that the repeated play of these games requires some consideration for the
potential of reputational effects. One of the first papers to consider the role of reputations in
finitely repeated games was Kreps and Wilson (1982) in the context of “the chain-store paradox”
(Selten 1978). Their paper considers how imperfect information acts as a mechanism for how
strategies in one period can influence payoffs in the next. Allowing for one-sided and two-sided
uncertainty, they demonstrate that the development of a reputation can, in fact, be advantageous
in the way one intuitively expects. Technically, they also demonstrate that a discrete, turn-based
model converges to a continuous, simultaneous-move model.
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Not long after Kreps and Wilson (1982), an impressive literature on bargaining followed,
predominantly assuming situations with one-sided incomplete information. This began a
literature on signaling in dynamic games, foremost were Grossman and Perry (1986), Chatterjee
and Samuelson (1987) and Admati and Perry (1987). In these papers, the seller’s valuation is
common knowledge but buyers have multiple types. The common theoretical result is that
buyers with low valuations delay in their response to a seller’s proposal as a way to signal their
true valuation. This leads to better payoffs for these buyers. More recent developments in this
area have included the consideration of mediators (Jarque et al. 2003). Here, bargaining takes
place without each of the contestants knowing the concessions made by others - they are only
aware that the contest is still ongoing. Multiple “levels” of concessions are allowed, and the
mediator ends the contest when an agreement takes place. In an interesting, and more recent
paper, Hörner and Sahuguet (2007) explores strategies in a two-stage all-pay auction that involve
signaling from weak players (bluffing) as well as the possibility for strong players send
misrepresent their strength (sandbagging). These strategies are advantageous in the model
design because there are multiple auctions.
Another important application of the war of attrition, which is particularly important to this
chapter, is with respect to funding public goods. Bliss and Nalebuff (1984) suggests that finding a
contributor for a public good is very similar to a war of attrition because until the public good is
funded the participants are not benefiting from the good, which is costly. In their paper, the
example they offer is that of a library being built, or waiting for someone to open a window
when it’s hot. The notion here is that each contestant has an individual cost they must incur until
the public good is provided. That paper also presents a series of theorems that reflect standard
predictions in this public goods setting. Some of the more insightful predictions include
“Theorem 1: Each agent’s optimal waiting time increases monotonically with respect to his cost
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of providing the good and is directly proportional to n-1 when there are n agents,” “Theorem 2:
Increasing the number of participants, although increasing everyone’s waiting time, also raises
their expected utility,” and “Theorem 4: The good will always be supplied by the agent with the
minimum cost. When the distribution of the minimum cost agent becomes ’riskier’, this change
is expected to prolong the waiting time before the good is supplied,” Bliss and Nalebuff (1984, p.
3).1 A similar paper, Osborne (1985), also addresses this waiting game in public good
contributions, but instead defines a finite horizon game where an indivisible prize shrinks in
value through time. In that paper, one contestant must make a concession for the prize to stop
shrinking. This chapter relies on an assumption that each party will, with some probability,
concede immediately at the beginning. A more recent paper in this area, LaCasse et al. (2002),
extends the analysis of Bliss and Nalebuff (1984) with a model that assumes there are c public
goods and n contestants. Here, c wars of attrition are waged simultaneously to determine who
will provide these public goods. That paper presents the subgame perfect equilibrium when
c = n = 2, but finds that the multiplicity beyond this special case makes characterizing
equilibrium difficult.
The lobbying of legislatures is a more recent application of the war of attrition in political science.
In a pair of papers, Dekel et al. (2008, 2009) consider, first, how candidates for public office would
solicit votes in an election when the notion of buying votes is publicly acceptable and legal.
While the model relies on an all-pay auction to describe investments from candidates, this notion
of “buying” can be framed as designing one’s platform for the campaign. Here, the authors focus
primarily on a sequential and complete information design. Second, the authors consider the
payments lobbyists would make to legislatures in a similar design, again, if doing so were
publicly acceptable and legal.
1Bliss and Nalebuff (1984) use the definition provided by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) for
what is “riskier”.
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Other theoretical considerations that are apropos to the war of attrition include the dollar auction,
the tug of war and the ability to jump bid in a sequential all-pay auction. The dollar auction is an
all-pay auction where the two highest bidders must pay their bids, but only the higher of the two
gets the dollar. This auction was designed to show that individuals who have complete
information in a sequential move game will indeed make economically irrational decisions. In
O’Neill (1986) and Leininger (1989), the authors modify the original dollar auction presented in
Shubik (1971). These modifications both assume that there are known budget constraints that
allow for backward induction to take place, which does not allow for escalation to take place.
Here, only one bid is offered and the level of this bid is sensitive to the budget constraints.
The “tug of war” is a modification of the war of attrition. Here, a player must win a series of
contests to claim a prize, whereas in the war of attrition a contestant may quit at any time. It is
called a tug of war because, reminiscent of the gym class activity, each contest won brings the
participant closer to a victory. Konrad and Kovenock (2005) reports a unique Markov perfect
equilibrium where contestants focus their effort on “tipping states” which are determined, in
part, by their relative strength. They also show that each contest outcome in the tug of war is
stochastic, but the eminence of one’s victory increases the probability that they win. Moreover,
Agastya and McAfee (2006) corroborate the prediction that one’s likelihood of losing the tug of
war decreases the likelihood they win succeeding battles.
With respect to jump bidding, Hörner and Sahuguet (2011) suggest that a single and continuous
cost paid per time unit is an unreasonable assumption to make for many situations currently
modeled as a war of attrition. In an alternative proposition, the authors evaluate how strategies
would change when contestants are allowed to vary the amount they choose to spend in a given
time period. In their setup, these bids reveal information about valuations, and contestants must
match their opponents’ total expenditures or else exit. Games of complete information are given
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the primary focus, along with the mixed strategies thereof - though there are asymmetric
equilibria where a bidder will give up with a high probability at the beginning. The authors find
that expected delay is shorter and rent dissipation is smaller with these assumptions. This is
partly due to the ability for contestants to jump bid.
Finally, among the most advanced and generalized models of the war of attrition includes Bulow
and Klemperer (1999), which provides defines the unique perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium for
any n contestant and k prize contest with private information. Their paper built from the
contributions of Hendricks et al. (1988). In Bulow and Klemperer (1999), the authors show that
for any war of attrition with no continuation cost (i.e. when contestants who exit don’t incur any
costs while the contest is ongoing) all but k + 1 contestants will drop out instantaneously. It is
further shown that this result is efficient.
2.2 Theoretical Overview of the War of Attrition
The war of attrition is a form of competition that requires each of the n participants to pay a
continuation cost for the right to one of k < n prizes. This process continues until only k
participants are willing to continue paying said cost, and these participants receive the prizes. A
participant’s unwillingness to continue will be referred to as exiting. The war of attrition is very
similar to the all-pay auction, in which all bidders must pay their bids, regardless of whether
they claim the auctioned item(s). In fact, a war of attrition is equivalent to the (k + 1)th price
all-pay auction since the contest ends when (k + 1)th participant exits and the n− k participants
who exited must pay their bids. In this section, I will delineate a participant’s optimal strategy in
the war of attrition under various assumptions, each of which will help us understand the
solution provided for a setting that requires upfront investments.
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2.2.1 N Participants, K Prizes, and Complete Information
To begin, let’s consider a very simple situation where there are n = 2 participants and k = 1
prizes. This discussion is largely derived by Levin (2004). Assume both participants’ values for
the prize are common knowledge. The continuation cost is c per unit time, t. A pure strategy for
participant i is to choose a time ti that she will exit. Alternatively, a mixed strategy requires that
participant i choose a distribution Fi(t) over exit times where fi(t) defines the probability of
exiting at time t.
In the mixed strategy equilibrium, participant i’s strategy must make participant j 6= i indifferent
between dropping out at time tj and waiting to drop out at time tj + dtj . The payout function for




[vj − cx]fi(x)dx− ct[1− Fi(tj)]. (2.1)
The first terms of this payout function,
∫ tj
0 [v − cx]fi(x)dx defines the payout to j from choosing
to stay in until tj , based on i choosing to exit at time x ≤ t with the probability fi(x). The second
term, ct[1− Fi(tj)] defines the payout to j when i chooses to exit at a time greater than tj .
Differentiating (2.1) with respect to tj and setting the result equal to 0 gives the first order
condition,
[vj − ctj ]fi(tj)− c[1− tfi(tj) + Fi(tj)] = 0.





where fi(t)1−Fi(t) is more commonly referred to participant i’s hazard rate, h(t). Equation (2.2)
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reflects that the benefit of staying in must equal the cost. Alternatively, setting vh(t)dt = cdt
states that the marginal benefit of staying in dt longer must equal the marginal cost. Solving the
differential equation and imposing that F (0) = 0 leads to Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. For n = 2 there is a unique symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium where







This mixed strategy solution leads to rather unintuitive predictions of competition when vi 6= vj .
For example, if vi = avj , then participant i must exit at a rate 1a of j. This implies that the
participant with the relatively large value exits faster in expectation.
Now consider the possibility of pure strategy equilibria in this setting. There is no pure strategy
where participant i will compete until some predetermined time 0 < t∗i < vj , as this motivates
the participant j to exit at time t∗i + ε where j wins for certain. Participant i would have been
better exiting at time t = 0. The incentive to one-up the other participant means there is no
symmetric pure strategy equilibrium. This leads to Proposition 2, which presents the only stable
pure strategies in this setting.
Proposition 2. There exist asymmetric pure strategy Nash equilibria such that participant i exits
at ti ≥ vj and participant j exits at t = 0. These equilibria are efficient when bidder i wins if
vi ≥ vj .
Relative to the mixed strategy equilibrium from Proposition 1, the notion of an asymmetric pure
strategy is more appealing for vi 6= vj . Moreover, the equilibria in Proposition 2 are efficient
while the equilibrium in Proposition 1 is not.2 This is due to one of the participants exiting
immediately for certain in the former, which eliminates the contest entirely. This, however, will
2This notion of efficiency is relevant in the context of most contests, except when there are
welfare gains to some third party from the amount of effort/resources spent, such as in an auction
setting.
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not normally be the case in the latter.
The logic of the mixed and pure strategies in this simple setting extends to the more general
model with n participants and k prizes. The consequence of generalizing the model is that there
is no longer a unique equilibrium in mixed strategies. While all equilibria will not be addressed,
nor proofs provided, a few examples will be. As in the n = 2 case, pure strategies involving a
participant exiting for certain after a predetermined time T > 0 cannot be optimal; these
participants will always be better off exiting at t = 0. However, pure strategy equilibria where
n− k participants drop out immediately are possible, though they require the coordination to do
so.
Among mixed strategy equilibria in the generalized model, exits must occur at either the
beginning or the end of the contest, and they often require a great deal of coordination among the
participants. For instance, all n participants may delay exit so long as they coordinate upon who
among them will exit simultaneously and instantaneously as a response to another’s exit. As will
be discussed in the next subsection, another equilibrium allows for n− k − 1 participants to exit
immediately while the remaining k + 1 participants to exit probabilistically. This equilibrium is
thoroughly examined in Bulow and Klemperer (1999). Moreover their paper shows that, in the
presence of unknown values, this is a unique symmetric perfect-Bayesian equilibrium.
2.2.2 N Participants, K Prizes, and Incomplete Information
In this subsection I will work through optimal bidding behavior for situations where there is
incomplete information. In particular, I will address what an exit strategy looks like when the
other participants’ valuations of the prize are independently and identically distributed
according to some distribution F . As a result of the added uncertainty over others’ valuations,
one’s bidding strategy is now a function of their own valuation, b(v). Again, I begin by
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considering a simple setting where n = 2 and k = 1. After normalizing the continuation cost to




[v − b(x)]f(x)dx− b(r)[1− F (r)]. (2.4)
A relevant question from this setup is whether a participant has an incentive to misrepresent
their value so that r 6= v. This concern is thoroughly addressed in Myerson (1981), where, in
Lemma 1 of that paper, the revelation principle allows for a payout-equivalent equilibrium where
participants will truthfully reveal their types (i.e. to allow for r = v). Quoting the Lemma directly
from Myerson (1981, p. 62), it will also be Lemma 1 of this chapter:
Lemma 1. (The Revelation Principle, Myerson 1981) Given any feasible auction mechanism,
there exists an equivalent feasible direct revelation mechanism which gives to the seller and all
bidders the same expected utilities as in the given mechanism.
Proof: See Myerson (1981)
Lemma 1 can be imposed without loss of generality. Setting the first derivative of (2.4) with
respect to r equal to zero and imposing the revelation principle gives us
[v − b(v)]f(v)− b′(v)[1− F (v)] + b(v)f(v) = 0.





Integrating this expression gives







Since a participant with a zero valuation will bid zero (b(0) = 0), the optimal bidding strategy is
defined in Proposition 3.







In the case where n = 2 is a subgame (i.e. there were originally n > 2 participants and all but 2 of
them have exited at this point), this is also the unique symmetric perfect-Bayesian equilibrium
(Bulow and Klemperer 1999). In addition, this equilibrium is efficient as the individual with the
largest valuation will exit last. In the limiting case where all participants’ values are known (as in
the previous section), the pure strategy in Proposition 3 is replaced by the mixed strategy in
Proposition 1.
In the general model with n participants and k prizes, Bulow and Klemperer (1999) show that all
but k + 1 participants should drop out immediately, which they refer to as “instant sorting”. The
model presented in their paper relies on participants paying a cost c > 0 after they exited the
contest, and this cost is paid per unit time until the contest is resolved by the remaining
participants. Strictly speaking there is no equilibrium when c = 0, which would provide the
generalized solution to Proposition 3. However the unique symmetric perfect-Bayesian
equilibrium in their main proposition can be interpreted as c approaches zero.
2.3 The All-pay Auction
Addressing bidding behavior in the all-pay auction will also be important to understanding the
predictions made in a war of attrition with partially unrecoverable upfront investments. While
all-pay auctions are rarely used in auction settings, per se, they are very helpful in modeling
many economic phenomena including lobbying efforts and conflict. One application that will be
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explored further is the use of all-pay auctions to raise money for charity, which, it will be shown,
outperform other auction mechanisms. I will limit the discussion of all-pay auctions to a specific
case where there are n participants, k = 1 prizes, and complete information.
N Participants, 1 Prize, and Complete Information
In the all-pay auction, bidders who submit a positive bid must pay some positive amount less
than or equal to their bid. In the case of the first price all-pay auction, which is what I will address
here, each bidder is responsible for paying their bid exactly. Because one’s bid must be forfeited
regardless of winning or losing, this incentivizes bidders to bid aggressively, if at all. Moreover,
all equilibria are in mixed strategies when there is complete information (Baye et al. 1996).3
A symmetric equilibrium for an item with a pure common value, v, is straight forward to show -
and this will be sufficient for the purposes of this chapter. Following Baye et al. (1996), let F
define the cumulative density function where F (x) gives the probability that a bidder bids less
than x. A bidder’s expected payout from bidding x in this setting is




= vF (x)n−1 − x.
(2.6)
To ensure a bidder is indifferent among all bids in the support of F , it must be that each x yields
the same payout in expectation such that U(x) = c. Because a bid of zero must also have a payout
of zero, U(0) = 0 = c, this yields F (0) = 0 from (2.6). Setting U(x) in (2.6) equal to zero provides







3Baye et al. (1996) also shows that there are asymmetric equilibria, even when the game itself
is symmetric.
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2.4 The War of Attrition with Unrecoverable Upfront Investments
This chapter models a war of attrition that requires participants to draw from a fixed endowment
that is endogenously determined before the auction begins. This design may be helpful for
understanding many competitive situations with limited but unknown resources. In addition to
auctions, this includes situations where multiple participants must pre-commit to providing a
certain good or service in exchange for an indivisible prize, but both may renege a fraction of
said good or service when one forfeits pursuit of the prize (e.g. firms competing over market
share or product quality, bribes, and contracts).
This theoretical design bridges the gap between the first price all-pay and the war of attrition by
allowing the re-purpose value of endowments to vary. By setting the re-purpose value of unused
endowments equal to zero (i.e., endowments only have value in the contest for which they were
purchased) one can make direct comparisons to the more familiar first price all-pay auction.
Setting the redemption value of unused endowments equal to their original cost (i.e.,
endowments do not lose value after the contest is over) recreates the war of attrition (the second
price all-pay auction) as it is typically modeled.
2.4.1 Preliminaries
In this contest there are n = 2 risk-neutral participants looking to claim a single prize with a pure
common value v. Figure 2-1 outlines the timing of the decision stages of this auction. Participants
incur a cost to compete for the prize at a normalized rate of 1 per unit time, t. Let t = 0 be the
pre-contest stage where participants privately choose an endowment e ∈ [0, e] they will draw
from during the contest. Let e be drawn independently and identically from the distribution F
where F (0) = 0 and F (e) = 1. It is assumed t = 0 is the only time participants can contribute to
their endowment for the contest. It is also assumed that F (·) is differentiable everywhere, and
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this probability density function will be denoted by f . This distribution describes the probability
with which a participant chooses a particular endowment z such that f(z) = Pr(e = z).




Time t = 0
Contest Stage:
Participants choose to bid/exit
Time t > 0
If, after the contest has been resolved, a participant has any endowment remaining (i.e. not spent
in the contest) it may be re-purposed for another use at a rate θ ∈ [0, 1] per unit of e. This can
occur in the contest for two reasons: 1) participants may choose to exit without using their entire
endowment or 2) a participant may win the auction before her endowment is fully exhausted.
2.4.2 Equilibrium Analysis: Contest Stage
Wars of attrition have a well understood solution concept as described in Section 2.2: at time t,
the cost of delaying an exit until t+ dt must equal the expected benefit of winning a prize at time
t+ dt. In the setup proposed by this chapter, participants have privately chosen their
endowments before the contest begins. Each resource (endowment) unit has a re-purpose value
of θ, thus the cost of staying in the auction dt longer is reduced to θdt, as described in the
previous section. This also means for an endowment of e a participant brings to the contest she
automatically forfeits (1− θ)e of it.
Extending the analysis provided in subsection 2.2, the payout to a participant with an




[v − θb(x)− (1− θ)e]f(x)dx− (θb(r) + (1− θ)e) [1− F (r)]
s.t. b(r) ≤ e.
(2.8)
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A unique constraint is placed on participants in this setting: bidding strategies must reflect that
no one may bid more than their endowment, so b(r) ≤ e. Taking the first derivative of (2.8) with
respect to r, setting it equal to zero and then imposing the revelation principle gives us
vf(e)− θb(e)f(e)− (1− θ)ef(e)− θb′(e)[1− F (e)] + θb(e)f(e) + (1− θ)ef(e) = 0,
which simplifies to
vf(e) = θb′(e)[1− F (e)].
Rearranging and integrating this expression gives















with the second equality following from the fact that a participant with an endowment of zero
must also have a bid of zero, i.e. b(0) = 0. One can show that if the constraint b(e) ≤ e is ignored
then the optimal bidding strategy leads to a negative payout when θ < 1. To see this, substitute
(2.9) into (2.8), and the resulting expression reduces to u = −(1− θ)e. Only when θ = 1 is there a
non-negative expected payout to participants (u = 0), which is the same result found in
subsection 2.1. Another way to demonstrate that the “optimal bidding strategy” in (2.9) leads to
negative payouts is to show that, after integrating (2.9), the solution for the bidding function can




This means the following inequality must hold:
−v
θ
ln[1− F (e)] ≤ e.
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After rearranging, this inequality can also be expressed as












where θ = c = 1. Pairing Proposition 1 with (2.10) reveals that the F associated with the optimal
bidding strategy for all θ first-order stochastically dominate the F in Proposition 1. Because of
this, the optimal bidding strategy leads to the negative payouts expected for θ < 1. This reveals
that the constraint b(e) ≤ e must be binding so that b(e) = e. Another way to interpret this result
is to say participants choose their endowments probabilistically and only exit when they have
exhausted it.
2.4.3 Equilibrium Analysis: Endowment Stage
Using the bid function b(e) = e, which implicitly imposes the revelation principle, and








[v − θx− (1− θ)e]f(x)dx− e[1− F (e)].
Taking the first order condition and setting it equal to zero yields the differential equation
0 = [v − θe− (1− θ)e]f(e) + ef(e)− 1 + F (e)− (1− θ)F (e)
= vf(e) + θF (e)− 1.
Solving the differential equation above and imposing F (0) = 0 leads to Proposition 4.
















It is straight-forward to show that when θ = 0, 1 we return to the solutions of the first price
all-pay auction and war of attrition, respectively. In the former, this is due to limθ→
>
0 F (e) =
e
v ,
which is equivalent to (2.7) for n = 2; in the latter, this is due to F (e) being equivalent to (2.3)
when θ = 1.
Because this is an all-pay auction, and because revenue is determined by the bidder who exits
first, we must rely on the first order statistic to determine expected revenue. For this war of
attrition, when bidders draw their endowments let f(1)(e) define the probability that e is the
smaller of two independent draws from F , thereby describing the first order statistic. There are
two ways an endowment of e can be the smallest value drawn from f . The first is if ei < ej , and
the second is if ej < ei. The probability a bidder chooses an endowment of e is f(e), and the
probability the other bidder has an endowment greater than e is [1− F (e)]. Therefore, the first
order statistic of this distribution is f(1)(e) = f(ei)[1− F (ej)] + f(ej)[1− F (ei)] = 2f(e)[1− F (e)].
Revenue is most easily identified by two separate sources. The first source is the unredeemable
fraction of bidders’ endowments, (1− θ)e. This source of revenue is independent of bidding
strategies as it is determined when bidders choose their endowments at time t = 0. The second
source is the amount of their endowment bidders choose to bid, which has a remaining per-unit
value of θ. This, along with bidders only exiting when their entire endowment is exhausted,
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leads to the revenue function
R = 2(1− θ)
∫ ē
0








where ē⇒ F (ē) = 1. The value of ē varies with θ. To explicitly define the value of ē for all θ we












= θ ⇒ ē = −vθ ln[1− θ]. We find that limθ→> 0 ē = v and
when limθ→
<
1 ē =∞. These distributions mirror those found in all-pay auctions and wars of
attrition with complete information, respectively. It is straight forward to show that this auction
adheres to the revenue equivalence theorem, as (2.12) reduces to R = v.
2.5 Wars of Attrition with Unrecoverable Upfront Investments for Charity
Auctions are an increasingly popular method for charitable organizations to meet their
fund-raising goals. This trend is with merit, as much of the theoretical and empirical literature on
bidder behavior in charity auctions demonstrate that they are superior revenue-raising
mechanisms over similar methods (e.g., raffles or voluntary contributions). Moreover, auctions
often play an important role in the fund-raising activities of many charitable and non-profit
organizations. In many cases, the organization receives in-kind donations that do not have
mission-oriented value but do have economic value. For instance, in a recent charity auction for a
human rights organization, Apple CEO Tim Cook agreed to have a coffee date with the highest
bidder, from which over $600,000 was raised.
Engers and McManus (2007) reveals the very important result for auctions in charity settings that
different mechanisms will raise different amounts of revenue in expectation. This stands in stark
contrast to much of the for-profit auction literature (cf. Vickrey 1961; Riley and Samuelson 1981;
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Klemperer 1999). The loss of revenue equivalence is due to the assumptions made regarding
bidders’ preferences toward the auctioneer (i.e. charity). Typically, two marginal benefits are
assumed on behalf of bidders: 1) bidders receive indirect benefits from the amount of revenue
generated by all bidders for the charity, and 2) bidders feel good for personally contributing to the
charity (i.e., “warm glow”). In this context, Engers and McManus (2007) shows that winner-pay
auctions and all-pay auctions leverage bidders’ preferences toward the auctioneer (i.e., charity) to
different degrees. Specifically, they show that the first price all-pay auction will raise more
revenue than the second price winner-pay auction, which in turn raises more than the first price
winner-pay auction. The intuition of this result rests in the source of revenues: in winner-pay
auctions the revenue is generated from a single bidder (the winner), while in all-pay auctions the
revenue is generated by all bidders. This difference incentivizes relatively larger contributions in
all-pay auctions. Goeree et al. (2005) shows, albeit in a relatively extreme example, that this
advantage over winner-pay auctions can be extended to lotteries as well.
Carpenter et al. (2013) extends the theoretical predictions of all-pay charity auctions in Enger and
McManus (2007) and Goeree et al. (2005) to the war of attrition through a mechanism called the
“bucket auction”. The war of attrition is shown to raise more revenue in expectation than the first
price all-pay auction. The improvement is non-negligible, too: for n = 10 participants, the war of
attrition should raise nearly 10% more revenue than the first price all-pay auction (and nearly
25% more than the first price winner-pay auction).
As mentioned previously, these theoretical predictions are a result of assuming two types of
preferences toward the charity. This section adopts the literature’s two primary assumptions
formally: 1) participants receive a constant marginal benefit α > 0 for each unit of revenue
generated by all bidders, and 2) participants receive a constant marginal benefit γ > 0 for each
unit of revenue they personally generated. To avoid the theoretical possibility that bidders are
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willing to give an unlimited amount of money to the charity, it is assumed that 2α+ γ < 1, as the
cost of bidding has been normalized to one.
2.5.1 Equilibrium Analysis: Contest Stage
The necessary modification of the theory from Section 2.4 is the introduction of the constant
marginal benefits α and γ. As before, consider a contest with n = 2 bidders. Let b(r) denote the
bid function of a bidder with an endowment of e, who behaves as though they have an
endowment of r. Table 2.1 defines the costs and benefits to bidder i from winning the auction.4
The first column labeled “Auction-based” describes the payouts attributed to bidding in the
bucket auction without considering the social preferences captured in α and γ. The second
column labeled “Indirect Benefit” captures the benefits associated with α, the amount of revenue
that is raised. Note that in the two bidder case, this benefit is generated from the amount
contributed through bidding and through the unredeemable portion of each bidder’s auction
currency. Since the auction currency purchased by others is never revealed, the contribution from
their unredeemable currency is based in expectation. In the last column, the payouts associated
with warm glow are captured by γ. Rows break down payouts based on bidders’ strategies. The
first row is based on one’s bidding strategy, while the second and third rows break down payouts
by each bidder’s endowment strategy.
Table 2.1: Payout from Winning
Auction-based Indirect Benefit Warm Glow Benefit
Bidding Strategy: v − θb(r) +2αθb(r) +γθb(r)






4The only modification to Table 2.1 needed to describe the payout to losing the auction is to
remove the value of the item, v.
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The terms in Table 2.1 are combined into the bidder’s payout function,
u(r, e) =∫ r
0
[













s.t. b(r) ≤ e,
(2.13)
which also reflects the constraint that one’s bid may not exceed their endowment, b(r) ≤ e. By
taking the first derivative of (2.13) with respect to r and setting it equal to zero we find
0 = vf(r)− θ(1− 2α− γ)[1− F (r)]b′(r).







Integrating over b′(e) gives















where the constant of integration b(0) = 0, a result of the participant with an endowment of zero
being forced to submit a bid of zero. Also, when θ = 1, we find the same theoretical result
reported in Carpenter et al. (2013) where θ = 1 is an implicit assumption in their model.5
5The only difference here is that this model assumes a pure common value while Carpenter et
al. (2013) assumes a distribution of values.
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As a result, the optimal bid function in the contest stage will also be bounded by the constraint
b(e) ≤ e.
2.5.2 Equilibrium Analysis: Endowment Stage
Using the bid function b(e) = e, which implicitly imposes the revelation principle, and


































Taking the first order condition and setting it equal to zero yields the differential equation
0 = vf(e) + (1− 2α− γ)θF (e)− (1− (1 + θ)α− γ). (2.15)
Solving (2.15) and imposing F (0) = 0 leads to Proposition 5.
















As in the for-profit setting, one can consider the solutions of the first price all-pay auction and
war of attrition when θ = 0, 1, respectively. In the former, this is due again to
limθ→
>
0 F (e) =
1−α−γ
v e, which is equivalent to (2.7) for n = 2 in a charity setting; in the latter, this
is due to F (e) being equivalent to (2.3) when θ = 1 in a charity setting.
Corroborating the theoretical results of earlier papers, revenue in this charity setting does not
adhere to revenue equivalence. In particular it can be shown using (2.12) that expected revenue is
strictly increasing in θ according to the F in (2.16). The value of ē increases due to the charity
parameters, which means that bidders are willing to take a larger endowment. A restriction of
non-negative values for α and γ leads to




1− (1− 2α− γ)θ
1− (1 + θ)α− γ
]
.
While the expected revenue function does not reduce into a compact or interpretable solution,
the loss of revenue equivalence is illustrated in Figure 2-2 for given values for v, α, and γ. This is
a representative illustration of how revenue changes with θ as long as α > 0. For cases where
α = 0 and γ > 0 revenue equivalence holds and expected revenue increases with γ.
2.6 Conclusion
In many wars of attrition, particularly ones that are pre-calculated, contestants may need to
choose how much of their resources they are willing to devote to the conflict. This resource
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Figure 2-2: Expected Revenue Increases with the Redemption Value (θ)
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allocation to the contest simultaneously determines the maximum amount of time that a
contestant can compete. In a theoretical variation from the traditional war of attrition, this
chapter considers how bidder strategies change when it is necessary for resource endowments to
be determined. It does so through a two-stage design where, in the first stage, contestants choose
how much of their resources they are willing to contribute to the contest, which is private
information, and, in the second stage, choose for how long to compete given those resources. In
addition, it is assumed that resources dedicated to the conflict, but not ultimately utilized for that
purpose, have a re-purpose value. This re-purpose value is common to all contestants, but is
allowed to vary from zero re-purpose value to full re-purpose value. When the re-purpose value
is zero for contestants, then this variation of the war of attrition is effectively a first price all-pay
auction. When the re-purpose value is full, then this war of attrition reverts to the standard
model.
The model presented in this chapter demonstrates that there is a unique symmetric perfect
Bayesian equilibrium where bidders in the second (bidding) stage use a pure strategy of
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competing until their resource is exhausted, and rely on a mixed strategy in the first stage when
they choose their resource endowment. Furthermore, it is shown that the larger the re-purpose
value of unused resources the longer the contest lasts in expectation. However, this change in
contest duration is counteracted by changes in the equilibrium distribution of resource
endowments, which maintains revenue equivalence - regardless of the re-purpose value of
unused resource endowments, the war of attrition always generates an expected revenue of the
item’s value.
Finally, the theoretical results are extended to describe bidding behavior in charity auctions.
Here, common assumptions of bidders’ revenue-based benefits demonstrate how behavior
changes with the re-purpose value of resources dedicated to the charity. Interestingly, revenue
equivalence breaks down. Given standard rational assumptions of bidders in charity auctions,
wars of attrition with larger re-purpose values will generate larger revenues. This corroborates
similar theoretical findings in the charity auction literature.
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3 Chapter 3: Bidder Behavior in All-pay Auctions for Charity
Auctions are an increasingly popular method for charitable organizations to meet their
fund-raising goals. This trend is with merit, as much of the theoretical and empirical literature on
bidder behavior in charity auctions demonstrate that they are superior revenue-raising
mechanisms over similar methods (e.g., raffles or voluntary contributions). Moreover, auctions
often play a fundamental role in the fund-raising activities of many charitable and non-profit
organizations; in many cases, the organization receives in-kind donations that do not have
mission-oriented value but do have economic value. For instance, in a recent charity auction for a
human rights organization, Apple CEO Tim Cook agreed to have a coffee date with the highest
bidder, from which over $600,000 was raised.
This chapter investigates the first price all-pay auction and several variations of the bucket
auction, a type of war of attrition, which involves incremental bidding, to identify
mechanism-specific characteristics (e.g., incremental vs. sump-lum bidding) and bidder-specific
characteristics (e.g., competitiveness, sunk cost sensitivity) that may be responsible for their
overwhelming success. The theoretical model presented in this chapter underpins the bidding
behavior of rational agents, while the experiments highlight the behavioral tendencies of human
subjects.
3.1 Literature Review
There are several reasons to be optimistic about the potential of all-pay auctions for fund-raising
purposes. Lotteries, which themselves are inefficient all-pay auctions, are extremely popular
across the world. The North American Association of State and Provincial Lotteries reports that
nearly 69 billion dollars was spent on lotteries in the United States in 2012 - 19.4 billion was
returned to players in the form of winnings (NASPL 2014). This is equivalent to every single
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American spending, on average, $219 a year on lotteries. Moreover, according to the
aforementioned association, in the last 50 years over 290 billion dollars have been generated for
education and public projects through these state-run lotteries.
In lotteries, a participant’s purchase of tickets creates a negative externality on other participants
by making others’ tickets less valuable in expectation. This is counteracted by the positive
externality giving to the public good has. In laboratory settings, Morgan and Sefton (2000), Lange
et al. (2007) and Orzen (2008) demonstrate that lotteries are more successful at funding public
goods than the voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM). Similar results are reported in Landry
et al. (2006), which provides evidence from a field experiment that lotteries are capable of
eliciting larger (gross) contributions for a charity more successfully than VCM. These results are
consistent with the theoretical advantages of lotteries over the VCM. In particular, Morgan (2000)
demonstrates that lotteries, relative to VCM, will raise more in contributions and improve
welfare. This result is due to a compensating (negative) externality that occurs among the ticket
holders - the purchase of tickets by one player decreases the likelihood that another player wins.
If the random prize allocation mechanism inherent in a lottery is forgone and, instead, the prize
is allocated to the largest contributor then we have the all-pay auction. As Goeree et al. (2005)
demonstrates, this change improves efficiency, which in turn increases total contribution. Similar
theoretical predictions of all-pay auctions outperforming lotteries are described in Orzen (2008),
Corazzini et al. (2010), and Faravelli (2011).
Importantly, the advantages of all-pay auctions over lotteries do not extend to every auction
mechanism. Engers and McManus (2007) reveals the very important result for auctions in charity
settings that different mechanisms will raise different amounts of revenue in expectation. The
loss of revenue equivalence is due to the assumptions made regarding bidders’ preferences
toward the auctioneer (i.e. charity). Typically, two marginal benefits are assumed on behalf of
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bidders: 1) bidders receive indirect benefits from the amount of revenue generated by all bidders
for the charity, and 2) bidders feel good (i.e. “warm glow”) for personally contributing to the
charity. In this context, Engers and McManus (2007) shows that winner-pay auctions and all-pay
auctions leverage bidders’ preferences toward the auctioneer (i.e. charity) to different degrees.
Specifically, they show that the all-pay auction will raise more than the second price winner-pay
auction, which in turn raises more than the first price winner-pay auction.
The intuition of the revenue discrepancy in winner-pay and all-pay auctions rests on the source
of revenues: in winner-pay auctions the revenue is generated from a single bidder (the winner),
while in all-pay auctions the revenue is generated by all bidders. This differences incentivizes
relatively larger contributions in all-pay auctions. Goeree et al. (2005) shows this in their
theoretical model where bidders have independent private values over the unit interval for a
prize (with incomplete information). Due to the charity setting, they assume that bidders receive
a fractional benefit for each dollar raised in the auction. Their paper reports that revenue in the
first price auction is greater in a charity setting than it is in a for-profit auction setting. However,
revenue is relatively less in winner-pay auctions because winning the auction comes at the cost of
no longer being able to free ride (i.e., winning the auction means one now must pay their bid). As
a result, this causes bids to be somewhat suppressed. In an all-pay mechanism, one’s ability to
free ride is eliminated because, win or lose, a bidder must always pay their bid. In other words,
an all-pay auction outperforms a winner-pay auction because the mechanism itself removes the
ability for bidders to free ride off the winner.
Nonetheless, much of the theoretical and empirical has given consideration to a variety of
winner-pay auction mechanisms, as these are the most commonly used mechanisms used by
organizations. For instance, Isaac and Schnier (2005) examine bidding behavior in silent auctions
for charity. In this study, field data and experimental data are collected. Generally in silent
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auctions there are many items being auctioned off simultaneously. In fact, one of the valuable
characteristics of silent auctions is that many bidders can participate in many auctions
simultaneously without the need for one (or many) auctioneers to facilitate them. Moreover, the
auctions typically rely on an publicly ascending mechanism as an English auction does.
Despite its benefits, there are several downsides that typically lead to poor performances in terms
of revenue. The first is that the silent auction is very susceptible to being “gamed”. Namely, it is
easy for a bidder to surreptitiously overbid using a false identity while also submitting the
second highest bid. While the overly high bid discourages others from participating, the
“winner” is never determined and the second highest bidder claims the prize for relatively little
money. The second issue with silent auctions is the simultaneity of auctions, which makes it
difficult for each auction to be efficient or raise as much money as it could if there were not
multiple auctions operating simultaneously.
In fact, Isaac and Schnier (2005) find that the silent auction tends to perform very poorly. Their
paper reveals that there is virtually no over-bidding in silent auctions are only about half of
auction ever exceed the minimum bidding increment. Their paper also considers what revenue
would be in the presence of pure altruism, in which case bidders do not care about the source of
the revenue. This is done computationally, and it is reported that there is little difference in
expected revenue. In light of these results, the authors suggest what may be the more substantial
source of charitable behavior is the act of donating items to be auctioned. However in a similar
study, Carpenter et al. (2011) shows that silent auctions can perform nearly as well as an English
auction if the auctioneers make some minor adjustments, such not using a pre-determined
deadline for bids which will discourage sniping.
In a very interesting comparison of the English auction and a lottery for their abilities to
incentivize and solicit contributions to public good, Davis et al. (2006) finds that a sufficiently
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high marginal per capita return (MPCR) lead to larger revenues in the lottery than in the English
auction. This result is largely dependent on the assumption that bidders’ values are common
knowledge. Their paper’s primary conjecture (Conjecture 1) is that any positive MPCR will
motivate bidders in the English auction to inflate the payment made by the individual with the
highest valuation. This result is also predicted in an early version of Engers and McManus
(2007).1 Theoretically, the knowledge of others’ valuations gives an advantage to the English
auction over a lottery for relatively small MPCRs. To the contrary, controlled laboratory
experiments reveal that lotteries uniformly raise more revenue than English auctions, even at
small MPCRs. This advantage, however, is more pronounced and more persistent through time
when MPCR is higher. Moreover, this result is rather robust across different distributions of
private values.
In a study from the field, Elfenbein and McManus (2007) compares revenues generated in
for-profit auctions and charity auctions on eBay. The charity auctions associated with eBay are
run by Giving Works where nearly all auctions donate 10-100% of the revenue to a disclosed
organization. On average, there is a 6% revenue premium in auctions for charity. In addition, the
paper reports that bidders typically refrained from “sniping” in charity auctions - a bidding
strategy involving last-minute topping bids that allow the bidder to win. Sniping also tends to
decrease the final bid in the auction. The fact that bidder tend to refrain from the strategy in
charity auction suggests that bidders are actively trying to increase the final bid, even if they do
not win. In a similar field experiment, Popkowski and Rothkopf (2006) run charity and for-profit
auctions for identical products online. In this study they find bid levels increase by more than
40% in charity auctions donating at least 25% of revenue. They also find that bid levels respond
to contribution levels in a consistent manner (i.e., the larger the contribution level the larger the
1This discussion was removed in the published version of the paper, though I have a copy of
the working paper for reference.
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bid level).
Not all experiments of charity auctions show revenues surpassing those of for-profit auctions. In
Isaac et al. (2008), a theoretical model is proposed wherein bidders receive proportional benefits
with respect to how much revenue is generated. The theoretical predictions for revenue for the
first price winner-pay and second price winner-pay auctions don’t exceed a for-profit auction by
a substantial amount. This is due largely to the assumptions made about who receives the
proportional benefits. In their paper, it is assumed only half of the bidders are capable of
receiving these benefits, and even these bidders do not receive the benefit if they do not win the
auction. This is referred to “See and Be Seen,” where the assumptions reflect how bidders may
behave if they only care about being acknowledged for their contribution. Their paper also
provides evidence in support of this prediction with a hybrid lab-field experiment. The
experiment examines behavior in an induced laboratory environment (where revenue does not
go to a real charity) as well as in a setting where bidders were allowed to send the revenue to a
charity of their choice. There was no substantial difference in revenue between the treatments.
In light of these results, it may be natural for practitioners to treat auctions simply as a
mechanism that converts donated items into cash, rather than an opportunity to incentive
donations (Orzen 2008). In fact, this already occurs with some regularity. According to Giving
USA, a public service foundation, 23 million itemized personal tax returns listed a non-cash
donation. Despite their economic value, many of these in-kind donations do not have
mission-oriented value, which necessitates an auction mechanism. These in-kind donations can
also take unusual forms that would not be captured in tax returns. For instance, in 2011 a charity
auctioned off the ability to job shadow Bill Clinton for a day that which raised $255,000.
While the theoretical literature on charity auctions uniformly touts the superior fund-raising
capacity of all-pay auctions, the empirical findings are certainly mixed. In field studies,
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Carpenter et al. (2008) and Onderstal et al. (2013) find that all-pay auctions under-perform
relative to the first price winner-pay (in the former) and the VCM (in the latter), both of which
conclude a lack of participation was the source of the shortfall. On the other hand, Carpenter et
al. (2013a) found the all-pay auction to raise more revenue than the first price winner-pay and the
second price winner-pay in a laboratory setting. Compared to lotteries, Shram and Onderstal
(2009) and Carpenter et al. (2013b) suggest all-pay auctions raise more revenue, however Orzen
(2008) and Corazzini et al. (2010) find the opposite result.
Resolving this empirical discrepancy on the all-pay auction’s ability to generate revenue has
important policy implications for fund-raisers and charitable organizations. One explanation for
these contradicting results is that the competition between bidders in the all-pay auction may be
negatively overshadowing the theoretical benefits of the mechanism. If so, heterogeneity in
competitiveness between bidders may be an important factor to consider. However, a
preponderance of the experimental findings on all-pay auctions (in for-profit contexts) reports
over-bidding, many of which consider competitiveness, or the “utility of winning,” to be an
explanation.2
Since all-pay auctions for charity occasionally fail due to a lack of participation, endogenous
entry into competitive environments is a relevant consideration. For instance, Morgan et al.
(2012) reports that there is over-entry in contests with relatively small prizes and under-entry
with relatively large prizes.3 In Eriksson et al. (2009), risk aversion tends to keep subjects out of
competitive environments (i.e. tournaments). But perhaps most interestingly, Bartling et al.
(2009) finds that inequality-averse subjects often opt-out of competitive environments. This result
seems particularly relevant in the context of charity auctions where bidders are more likely to be
2See Gneezy and Smorodinsky (2006), Ernst and Thoni (2009), Lugovskyy et al. (2010), Fehr
and Schmidt (2011), Klose and Sheremeta (2012), Ong and Chen (2012).
3The evidence in Morgan et al. (2012) is from a Tullock lottery contest, which is different than
the all-pay auction.
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inequality-averse, and may explain why participation can fall short in these settings.
While the context of early studies make it seem as though the value of charity auctions to be
primarily as a way to turn in-kind donations into cash - and there is certainly value there - more
recent empirical studies demonstrate that certain auction mechanisms can be overwhelmingly
successful in certain settings. In particular, mechanisms that require all bidders to pay a positive
amount that is less than or equal to their bid (i.e., all-pay auctions) are more successful than those
mechanisms where only the winner pays an amount less than or equal to their bid. While this
advantage of all-pay auctions over winner-pay auctions, it extends to lotteries in many
circumstances as well.
With respect to revenue, a new mechanism called the “bucket auction” (formally introduced in
Carpenter et al. 2013a) has the promise of harnessing the theoretical benefits of all-pay auctions
without its success requiring much at all on participation. The bucket auction is essentially a
sequential-move war of attrition (WoA), which is equivalent to a second price all-pay auction.4 In
the auction, bidders are endowed with auction currency, denoted by “tokens,” which have a
monetary value and are used for bidding. The auctioneer randomly arranges bidders in a circle
with one bidder being chosen to start the bidding process. This bidder has the choice to publicly
place one, and only one, of her tokens in a “bucket,” which will be referred to as bidding, or not
place a token in the bucket, which will be referred to as exiting. If she chooses to bid a token then
she loses the monetary value of the token but stays in the auction. If she chooses to exit then she
forfeits the auction and may not participate further.
The bucket auction has theoretical properties that improve revenue over even the first price
4A war of attrition is typically described as a competition among n participants each vying for
one of k < n prizes. It is costly to maintain one’s status as an “active” participant, but may exit
at any time - thereby forfeiting their claim to one of the k prizes. This competition continues (and
costs continue to accrue for active bidders) until n− k participants choose to exit. When modeled
with open loop strategies, the war of attrition is equivalent to the second price all-pay auction.
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all-pay auction. By imposing the assumptions associated with a charity setting to the generalized
framework in Bulow and Klemperer (1999), Carpenter et al. (2013a) shows that a bidder choosing
to delay exit generates a positive externality for other bidders. Namely, the act of staying in the
auction a little bit longer forces others to stay in a little bit longer than they otherwise would
have. This generates more revenue for the charity, which is assumed to also benefit all bidders
indirectly. While the bucket auction is predicted to outperform the first price all-pay, as well as
several varieties of winner-pay auctions, the empirical difference is staggering. In a laboratory
experiment where preferences for revenue generation were induced, Carpenter (2013a) reports
the bucket auction raised one and a half times as much revenue as the next best mechanism (the
first price all-pay). Very similar results are reported in Carpenter et al. (2013b), a field study
involving nearly 100 charity auctions across the United States. Because a war of attrition with
open-loop strategies is essentially a second price all-pay auction (Krishna and Morgan 1997), this
theoretical result is corroborated in Goeree et al. (2005), where the revenue generated in all-pay
auction increases as the prices paid by winners approaches the “last price” all-pay auction.
Bidder-specific characteristics are explored in Carpenter et al. (2013a) as potential explanations
for the extraordinary revenues generated from the bucket auction, such as sunk cost sensitivities
(also considered in Eyster 2002) and competitiveness. While these characteristics are consistent
with behavior driving revenues up in charity settings, Horisch and Kirchkamp (2007) find
under-bidding to be prevalent in wars of attrition in a for-profit context. This chapter continues
to explore bidder-specific characteristics, but also explores mechanism-specific characteristics
(e.g., incremental vs. lump-sum bidding) as potential explanations. By manipulating the
exchange value of unused auction currency (i.e. the monetary value of tokens that were never
bid) the bucket auction can be revenue equivalent to the first price all-pay auction or to the war




3.2.1 Bucket Auction Description
The bucket auction is a sequential-move war of attrition (WoA). The war of attrition is a well
understood form of competition that requires participants to pay a cost to continue until only k
participants are willing to continue paying said cost for the right to one of k prizes. In the bucket
auction, bidders (participants) are endowed with auction currency (“tokens”) which have a
monetary value and are used for bidding. In this variation, the amount of tokens a bidder brings
to the auction is privately and individually determined before the auction begins. The auctioneer
randomly arranges bidders in a circle with one bidder being chosen to start the bidding process.
This bidder has the choice to publicly place one, and only one, of her tokens in a “bucket,” which
will be referred to as bidding, or not, which will be referred to as exiting. If she chooses to bid a
token then she loses the monetary value of the token but stays in the auction. If she chooses to
exit then she forfeits the auction and may not participate further.
Once the first bidder bids or exits, the bucket is moved to the next bidder who must also choose
to bid or exit. This process continues until there are as many bidders who have not exited as
there are prizes, and these remaining bidders claim them. Regardless of the outcome of the
auction, all bidders must pay the monetary value of the tokens they personally placed in the
bucket. The bucket auction deviates from typical wars of the attrition in timing; bidders must
choose to bid or exit sequentially rather than simultaneously. This variation has little impact on
equilibrium behavior, however it does cause the bidding process to take longer. To make
deriving analytical predictions more straight-forward, the intra-circle sequential moves will be
abstracted from in the model.
63
This theoretical design bridges the gap between the first price all-pay and the bucket auction
through the variation of an unused token’s redemption value. By setting the redemption value of
unused tokens equal to zero (i.e., tokens only have value in the auction for which they were
purchased) we can make direct comparisons to the more familiar first price all-pay auction. The
ability to create revenue-equivalence the all-pay and this variation of the war of attrition allows
for a clean analysis of mechanism-specific effects, such as incremental vs.lump-sum bidding. It
also allows for analysis on bidder-specific “sensitivities” that are may be exploited by a
mechanism design, such as loss aversion, competitiveness, risk-taking attitudes, or sunk cost
sensitivities.
3.2.2 Preliminaries
In this auction there are n = 2 risk-neutral bidders looking to claim a single prize with a pure
common value v. Figure 3-1 outlines the timing of the decision stages of this auction. Bidders
incur a cost to compete for the prize at a normalized rate of 1 per unit time, t. Let t = 0 be the
pre-auction stage where bidders privately choose an endowment e ∈ [0, e] of auction currency
they will draw from during the auction. It is assumed t = 0 is the only time bidders can
contribute to their endowment for the auction. Let e be drawn independently and identically
from the distribution F where F (0) = 0 and F (e) = 1. It is also assumed that F (·) is
differentiable everywhere, and this probability density function will be denoted by f . This
distribution describes the probability with which a bidder chooses a particular endowment z
such that f(z) = Pr(e = z).
To simulate a charity setting, it is assumed that bidders receive benefits from the revenue
generated by the auction. Following Engers and McManus (2007) and Carpenter et al. (2013),
two constant marginal benefits will be added to the model. The first benefit α will measure the
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Time t = 0
Auction Stage:
Bidders choose to bid/exit
Time t > 0
constant marginal indirect benefit a bidder receives from the total amount of revenue raised. This
is benefit is independent of where the revenue originates (i.e. it does not depend on which
bidder(s) contributed to the total revenue). On the other hand, the second constant marginal
benefit assumes γ measures the benefit a bidder receives from personally contributing to the
auction revenue. Another way to think about γ is to imagine that bidders get “warm glow” from
contributing to the charity through the auction.
If, after the auction is over, a bidder has any endowment remaining (i.e. not spent in the auction)
it may be redeemed for cash at an exogenously determined rate θ ∈ [0, 1] per unit of e. Bidders
may have unused tokens at the end of the auction for two reasons: 1) bidders may choose to exit
without using their entire endowment or 2) a bidder may win the auction before her endowment
is fully exhausted. In the following subsections, I will demonstrate that when θ = 0 this variation
of the war of attrition is equivalent to the first price all-pay auction, and when θ = 1 it is
equivalent to the original war of attrition.
3.2.3 Equilibrium Analysis: Auction Stage
Wars of attrition have a well understood solution concept as described in Bulow and Klemperer
(1999): at time t, the cost of delaying an exit until t+ dt must equal the expected benefit of
winning a prize at time t+ dt. In the setup proposed by this chapter, bidders have privately
chosen their endowments before the auction begins. Each unit of currency has a redemption
value of θ, thus the cost of staying in the auction dt longer is reduced to θdt. This also means for
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an endowment of e a bidder brings to the auction she automatically forfeits (1− θ)e of it.
Let b(r) denote the bid function of a bidder with an endowment of e, who behaves as though
they have an endowment of r. Table 3.1 defines the costs and benefits to bidder i from winning
the auction.5 The first column labeled “Auction-based” describes the payouts attributed to
bidding the bucket auction without considering the social preferences captured in α and γ. The
second column labeled “Indirect Benefit” captures the benefits associated to α, the amount of
revenue that is raised. Note that this benefit is generated from the amount contributed through
bidding and through the unredeemable portion of bidder’s auction currency. Since the auction
currency purchased by others is never revealed, the contribution from their unredeemable
currency is based in expectation. In the last column, the payouts associated with “warm glow”
are captured by γ. Rows break down payouts based on bidders’ strategies. The first row is based
on one’s bidding strategy, while the second and third rows break down payouts by each bidder’s
endowment strategy.
Table 3.1: Payout from Winning
Auction-based Indirect Benefit Warm Glow Benefit
Bidding Strategy: v − θb(r) +2αθb(r) +γθb(r)






5The only modification to Table 3.1 needed to describe the payout to losing the auction is to
remove the value of the item, v.
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The terms in Table 3.1 are combined into the bidder’s payout function,
u(r, e) =∫ r
0
[













s.t. b(r) ≤ e,
(3.1)
which also reflects the constraint that one’s bid may not exceed their endowment, b(r) ≤ e. By
setting the first-order condition of (3.1) with respect to r equal to zero we find
0 = vf(r)− θ(1− 2α− γ)[1− F (r)]b′(r).







Integrating over b′(e) gives















where the constant of integration b(0) = 0, a result of the participant with an endowment of zero
being forced to submit a bid of zero. Also, when θ = 1, we find the same theoretical result
reported in Carpenter et al. (2013) where θ = 1 is an implicit assumption in their model.6
It can be shown that if the constraint b(e) ≤ e is ignored then the optimal bidding strategy leads
6The only difference here is that this model assumes a pure common value while Carpenter et
al. (2013) assumes a distribution of private values.
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to a negative payout when θ < 1. By substituting (3.2) into (3.1), the expression reduces to
u = −2α(1− θ)(1− F (e))
∫
zf(z)dz < 0. Only when θ = 1 is there a non-negative expected
payout to participants (u = 0). In addition, it can be shown that the F associated with the optimal
bidding function must first-order stochastically dominate a distribution F ′ that has an expected
payout of zero for all θ. This reveals that the constraint b(e) ≤ e must be binding so that b(e) = e.
Another way to interpret this result is to say participants choose their endowments
probabilistically and only exit when they have exhausted it.
3.2.4 Equilibrium Analysis: Endowment Stage
Being able to backward induct the optimal behavior in the auction stage allows us to define the
optimal strategy for choosing auction currency. Using the bid function b(e) = e, which implicitly


































Taking the first order condition and setting it equal to zero yields the differential equation
0 = vf(e) + (1− 2α− γ)θF (e)− (1− (1 + θ)α− γ).
Solving the differential equation above and imposing F (0) = 0 leads to Proposition 5.
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Proposition 1. For n = 2 and θ ∈ (0, 1) there is a unique symmetric perfect Bayesian Nash
equilibrium where
F (e) =












It can be shown that we return to the solutions of the first price all-pay auction and war of
attrition when we set θ = 0, 1, respectively. In the former, this is due again to
limθ→
>
0 F (e) =
1−α−γ
v e, which is equivalent to an all-pay auction (Baye et al. 1996) extended to a
charity setting; in the latter, this is due to F (e) being equivalent to the war of attrition in a charity
setting when θ = 1 .
Because this is an all-pay auction, and because revenue is determined by the bidder who exits
first, we must rely on the first order statistic to determine expected revenue. In general, the kth
order statistic is the value of the kth smallest value drawn from a sample of size greater than or
equal to k. Because we are interested in the bidder who drops out first we would like to know the
probability an endowment of e is the first smallest endowment. This is why we are interested in
the first order statistic.
For this war of attrition, when bidders draw their endowments let f(1)(e) define the probability e
is the smaller of two independent draws from F , thereby describing the 1st order statistic. There
are two ways an endowment of e can be the smallest value drawn from f . The first is if ei < ej ,
and the second is if ej < ei. The probability a bidder chooses an endowment of e is f(e), and the
probability the other bidder has an endowment greater than e is [1− F (e)]. Therefore, the first
order statistic of this distribution is f(1)(e) = f(ei)[1− F (ej)] + f(ej)[1− F (ei)] = 2f(e)[1− F (e)].
Revenue in this charity setting does not adhere to revenue equivalence. In particular it can be
shown using (3.4) that expected revenue is strictly increasing in θ according to the F in (3.3).
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Revenue is most easily identified by two separate sources. The first source is the unredeemable
fraction of bidders’ endowments, (1− θ)e. This source of revenue is independent of bidding
strategies as it is determined when bidders choose their endowments at time t = 0. The second
source is the amount of their endowment bidders choose to bid, which has a remaining per-unit
value of θ. This, along with bidders only exiting when their entire endowment is exhausted,
leads to the revenue function
R = 2(1− θ)
∫ ē
0








where ē⇒ F (ē) = 1.
The value of ē increases with the charity parameters, which means that bidders are willing to take
larger endowments as their benefits rise and this amount is greater than the value of the item v.





While the expected revenue function does not reduce into a compact or interpretable solution,
the loss of revenue equivalence is illustrated in Figure 3-2 for given values for v, α, and γ. This is
a representative illustration of how revenue changes with θ as long as α > 0. For cases where
α = 0 and γ > 0 we find revenue equivalence to hold and expected revenue to increase with γ.
3.3 Experiment Design
In this study, a total of 120 subjects were recruited to participate in one of ten sessions. Using a
between subjects design, sessions were equally split to test one of following five auction settings:
discrete all-pay auction; bucket auction (pre-purchase, θ = 0); bucket auction (pre-purchase,
θ = 0.5); bucket auction (pre-purchase, θ = 1); bucket auction (no pre-purchase, WoA). Sessions
took place in the Behavioral Business Research Laboratory at the University of Arkansas in
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Figure 3-2: Expected Revenue Increases with the Redemption Value (θ)
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groups of twelve subjects. With the use of the computer software, z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007),
subjects were seated at partitioned computer workstations to ensure private decision-making
and given computerized instructions about the experiment, at which point they were allowed to
ask procedural and clarifying questions.7 The entire experiment lasted approximately eighty
minutes, and subjects earned $20.95 on average.
The experimental design in this chapter employs features from Carpenter et al. (2013) that assist
in strengthening the external validity of laboratory charity auctions. The first such feature
involves subjects completing a task, where successfully doing so earns them money. This money
is then used during auctions later in the experiment. This feature discourages the risk seeking
behavior that can result from being given an endowment for auction participation (cf. Ackert et
al. 2006). The second feature is the ability for subjects to opt out of an auction, if they preferred
not to participate. This is an important feature also, as field experiments comparing participation
in charity auctions across mechanisms (e.g. Carpenter et al. 2008; Onderstal et al. 2013) have
7Instructions for a treatment of the bucket auction can be found in the appendix.
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demonstrated that differences in participation can explain the differences in revenue.
The instructions explained that the experiment consisted of two phases, each of which had an
undisclosed number of periods. In Phase 1, subjects were given multiple opportunities to earn
cash. This task consisted of counting how many numbers (0-9) there were in a series of 120
random characters that included both digits (0-9) and letters (A-Z) within 60 seconds (similar to
Foster 2013). Each of the 120 characters was equally likely to be one of the 36 alphanumeric
characters. If the subject reported the correct number or was off by at most 3 in absolute value
then she received $2, otherwise she received nothing. Table 3.2 shows an example of this effort
task.8 A relatively large margin of error was allowed in this task because the purpose of the task
was principally to avoid risk seeking behavior that may occur with unearned endowments.
Subjects were given eight opportunities to complete this task for a maximum possible
endowment of $16.
Table 3.2: Effort Task Example
8 3 P 2 M 9 L K V 5 W 9 G 5 2 X M E G P
6 E Y R 4 D S S 9 L V X 3 Q S M O H B A
R 9 Y Y P 2 4 A V 0 D R L Z X 8 3 A L J
7 Q 7 M I 2 D Z V 6 W Z U P L 2 G P Q J
F N N L Y J N N G D X J L Q 7 5 4 T F Q
V R H R D 8 R 0 7 C G P P X 3 L C X 9 0
In Phase 2, subjects were given multiple opportunities to participate in an auction using the
money they earned in Phase 1. Though the auction mechanism varied by session, the prize in the
auction was always a fictitious item worth $10. In the first 10 periods of Phase 2, bidders
participated in two bidder auctions, and it the last 10 periods bidders participated in six bidder
auctions for a total of 80 auctions per session. Bidders were randomly rematched in each auction.
During the two bidder auctions, the computer placed the 12 subjects in a given session into
8This example has 32 numbers in it. If the subject reported 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34 or 35 then she
earned $2.
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groups of four, and randomly rematched within that fixed group. This allowed for sufficient
randomness to avoid collusion, and also allowed for the isolation of dynamic session effects (cf.
Fréchette 2012). During the six bidder auctions, the computer randomized all 12 subjects from
that session into two groups. This is summarized in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Session Groups for Auctions
Auction Rematching by Period
Auctions Bidders per Auction Groups of
1-10 2 4 4 4
11-20 6 12
Two features were employed to maintain the fixed financial position of subjects for each auction.
First, at the beginning of each auction, bidders’ endowments were reset to the amount they
earned in Phase 1. This allows subjects to participate in an auction each period without affecting
their ability to participate in future auctions. Second, one of the twenty auctions was randomly
selected to determine the payoffs from Phase 2. As a result, a subject’s final earnings consisted of
her cumulative earnings from Phase 1, one randomly selected auction in Phase 2, and a show up
payment of $5.
In accord with the theoretical literature on charity auctions (e.g. Engers and McManus 2007;
Carpenter et al. 2013), two constant marginal benefits were induced in the auction to simulate a
charity setting. The particular parameters for these marginal benefits were chosen to be the same
as Carpenter et al. (2013). The first marginal benefit α = 0.1 is the indirect benefit associated to
the revenue generated by the auction. In the experiment, subjects were informed that for every
dollar of revenue generated, each of them would receive $0.10. The second marginal benefit
γ = 0.05 is the “warm glow” from personally contributing to the auction. As a result, for each
dollar a bidder personally contributed, she received $0.05.
After each auction, bidders were shown a break down of their earnings, which consisted of 1) the
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cost of tokens purchased for the auction, 2) the outcome of the auction (claimed the item or not),
3) the total revenue generated by the auction and their indirect benefit earnings from revenue,
and 4) the amount of money they personally contributed to the auction and their warm glow
earnings from their contribution. Table 3.4 outlines the theoretical predictions over revenue for
the parameters of this experiment. To make theoretical predictions the cost of a token ($0.50)
must be normalized to 1, which makes the item’s value v = 20. With respect to endowment
predictions, when θ → 1, e→∞. As a result, for θ = 1 it is a weakly dominant strategy for
bidders to convert their entire effort task earnings ẽ into auction currency for each auction. On
the other hand, in WoA, the bidders’ endowments are automatically converted into currency for
them.
Note that revenue predictions do not change within a mechanism when the number of bidders
increases, with the exception of θ = 0.5 which has yet to be explicitly defined. In the case of the
All-pay and θ = 0 mechanisms this is due to the theoretical predictions in Baye et al. (1996), which
shows that risk-neutral bidders will adjust their mixed bidding strategies as n changes.9 In the
case of the θ = 1 and WoA mechanisms, this is due to the theoretical predictions in Bulow and
Klemperer (1999), which shows that all but two bidders should exit the auction instantaneously.
In other words, it should be that at most only two bidders spend any tokens at all, and these two
bidders are instantaneously coordinated upon. This prediction is verified theoretically for the
charity setting in Carpenter et al. (2013).
Following Phase 2, subjects were asked to answer survey questions regarding their experience in
the auction as well as questions regarding hypothetical scenarios that could address their
9In particular, Baye et al. (1996) shows that the unique symmetric mixed strategy Nash equi-





n−1 . In the presence of α and γ, it is relatively straight forward to show this







Table 3.4: Endowment & Revenue Predictions by Mechanism (in $)
Parameters
v = $10 Token Cost = $0.50 α = 0.1 γ = 0.05
Predictions of Average Auction Currency Endowments
All-pay θ = 0 θ = 0.5 θ = 1 WoA
n = 2 5.88 5.88 7.55 ẽ ẽ
n = 6 1.96 1.96 ẽ ẽ
Predictions of Average Revenue
All-pay θ = 0 θ = 0.5 θ = 1 WoA
n = 2 11.76 11.76 11.82 13.33 13.33
n = 6 11.76 11.76 13.33 13.33
Notes: ẽ represents the bidder’s entire effort task earnings.
susceptibility to the sunk cost fallacy and competitive behavior.10 Many of these questions were
selected from a survey in Carpenter et al. (2010). It is often thought the reason why the bucket
auction performs so well is because sequential move auctions allow more latitude for competitive
types to bid more aggressively than simultaneous move auctions. In addition to this proposed
behavioral result, the bucket auction could invoke the sunk cost fallacy in some bidders due to
the reiterative bidding process and the notion of throwing “good money after bad.”
3.4 Experimental Results
The results reported here will primarily focus on three areas of analysis. The first area of analysis
will cover how auction currency endowments varied across mechanisms. The second area of
analysis will cover how individual contributions varied across mechanisms, which will also
address the issue of participation. Finally, the third area of analysis will cover whether survey
data indicates any behavioral factors influencing bidding behavior across mechanisms.
10These questions are included in the instructions found in the appendix.
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3.4.1 Auction Currency Endowment Strategies
Optimal endowment strategies were heavily influenced by the rate at which unused currency
could be redeemed. In particular, it was predicted that as the redemption value of currency
increased there would be greater demand of it for the auction. For the θ = 0 mechanism, it was
predicted that bidders would purchase currency in a manner equivalent to submitting a bid in a
sealed bid all-pay auction. In the two bidder auctions this was equivalent to each bidder taking
$5.88 US worth of currency on average. In the six bidder auctions this prediction decreased to
$1.96 US of currency on average. Figure 3-3 shows the average currency endowments for all
mechanisms along with the 95% confidence intervals of those averages. This table also includes
the theoretical predictions for currency endowments, and the average effort task earnings each
bidder had to draw from for a given auction.
In comparing the endowment strategies of bidders in the All-pay and θ = 0 mechanisms, Figure
3-3 shows that the average endowment in a two bidder θ = 0 auction is statistically significantly
greater than the prediction of 5.88 (p < 0.041), while it is not in the All-pay mechanism. However,
average endowments are statistically significantly greater in the six bidder auctions for both
mechanisms. Because six bidder auctions always followed two bidder auctions, it is not clear
why bidders are taking so much currency, as conceivably it could be due to a behavioral effect or,
perhaps more simply, because bidders fail to adjust their strategies to the presence of additional
bidders. The survey addressed at the end of this section partially addresses this concern.
With respect to the θ = 0.5 mechanism, it was predicted that bidders would be willing to take
more currency on average than the All-pay or θ = 0 mechanisms, since unused currency was
partially redeemable after the auction. Indeed, the average currency endowment did increase
relative to these other mechanisms, and it did so in a way similar to what was predicted. For two
bidder auctions, the average currency endowment was not statistically significant from the
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Figure 3-3: Auction Currency Bought in $




















predicted average. With respect to the six bidder auctions, there is no comparison of the
empirical average to a theoretical prediction because there is no model that addresses a setting
with n > 2 bidders.
In the θ = 1 mechanism, it was predicted that bidders would convert their entire effort task
earnings into auction currency for each auction, as this is the weakly dominant strategy
regardless of the number of bidders. This is opposed to the WoA mechanism, where each bidder
was forced to convert their entire effort task earnings into auction currency (i.e., this step was
performed for them automatically by the computer). Within the θ = 1 mechanism, bidders took
statistically significantly less currency than was predicted (p < 0.001 for two bidder auctions and
p < 0.001 for six bidder auctions). While there is a weakly dominated endowment and bidding
strategy involving a mixed strategy over endowments and then bidding the realized endowment
until it is exhausted, this is not the case in the data. In this treatment only 41% of bidders who
lost an auction (i.e., did not claim the item) bid until they ran out of currency. More information
regarding bidding strategies is provided in the next subsection. It is arguable that bidders used
the currency endowment stage to curb their contribution in the auction, essentially setting a
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self-enforced bidding limit.
3.4.2 Bidding Behavior, Individual Contributions & Participation
In the θ = 0 and θ = 0.5 mechanisms, bidders are predicted to choose their currency endowments
probabilistically and bid until they’ve exhausted their realized endowment. This is almost
always the case in θ = 0 auctions where 91% of bidders had no currency left when they exited.
However, this was much less likely to happen in the θ = 0.5 mechanism where only 71% of those
who exited a given auction had no tokens left. While it is possible for bidders to exhaust their
entire endowment in the θ = 1 mechanism, this should happen very infrequently (less than 5% of
the time) since they are predicted to convert all of their effort task earnings into auction currency.
The actual frequency of this happening in the θ = 1 mechanism, as previously mentioned, was
41%. This result is partly due to bidders curbing their currency endowments back, and partly
due to too many bidders exiting too late in the auction (i.e., bidding too aggressively).
From whom did the contributions come? In particular, were the results in revenue due to a few
bidders contributing a lot, or were contributions well distributed? It turns out the concentration
of contributions were well distributed across bidders for all mechanisms. In aggregate (for all
twenty auctions combined), 80% of the total contributions came from the top 54% to 66% of
contributors, depending on the mechanism. The distribution of contributions tended to be more
concentrated in the All-pay and θ = 0 mechanisms, which saw 80% of contributions come from
the top 54% and 62% of bidders respectively. In θ = 0.5 it was 62% as well. This concentration
lessened slightly as the redemption value of tokens increased. For the θ = 1 and WoA 80% of
contributions came from the top 62% and 66% contributors respectively. This suggests that larger
redemption values encouraged moderately high participation from many individuals.
One of the primary findings of this experiment is the “bucket premium” revealed in the
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comparison of contributions between the All-pay and θ = 0 mechanisms in Figure 3-4. It was
predicted that these two mechanisms should be identical with respect to endowment strategies,
and since currency has no redemption value here this means choosing an endowment is
equivalent to choosing a contribution amount in the auction. However, the bucket premium
shows that using a incremental bid mechanism leads to statistically significantly greater
contributions beyond what was theoretically predicted (p < 0.054). On the other hand, the All-pay
mechanism’s average contribution is not statistically significantly different from the theoretical
prediction, and moreover it is actually quite close to the point prediction. This premium is
equivalent to an 11% increase in expected revenue according to the average contributions in these
mechanisms, though these averages are not statistically significantly different. Contributions in
six bidder auctions were much greater than theoretical predictions for both mechanisms, and
revenues were exceedingly high as a result. In particular, the All-pay mechanism raised $21.18 US
on average for an item worth $10 US, while the θ = 0 mechanism raised $26.52 US on average.
The bucket premium grew with the number of bidders in the auction, as contributions in the
θ = 0 mechanism were 25% greater on average than they were in the All-pay mechanism.
Figure 3-4: Average Contribution by Mechanism in $






























The average contribution made by bidders in the θ = 0.5 mechanism is predicted to be slightly
less than the average endowment, as winners will redeem half of their remaining endowment at
the end of the auction, should they have any. Figure 3-4 shows that the average contribution in
this mechanism was slightly greater than the point prediction of $5.91 US, however not
statistically significantly so. The average revenue for this two bidder mechanism was $12.62 US,
which is slightly less than the θ = 0 mechanism. On the other hand, the six bidder mechanism
was the most successful in terms of revenue among those tested, which raised $29.40 US - nearly
three times the item’s value. Behavioral considerations discussed in the next subsection suggest
that the success of this mechanism may be related to bidders’ sunk cost sensitivities, which
makes those who are sunk cost sensitive to delay exit longer than they should by taking too large
of an endowment. This corroborates the results in Carpenter et al. (2013).
Another primary finding of these experiments is the (relatively) underwhelming performance of
the bucket auction in the θ = 1 and WoA mechanisms. Figure 3-4 shows in these mechanisms
bidder contributions in two bidder auctions are statistically significantly less than theoretically
predicted (p < 0.001 for θ = 1 and p < 0.026 for WoA). Though the bucket auction has never
previously been tested in a two bidder setting, this result is somewhat surprising given its
success with a handful more bidders (Carpenter et al. 2013; Carpenter et al. 2014). On the other
hand, Hörisch and Kirchkamp report systematic underbidding in traditional two bidder wars of
attrition (no charity preferences assumed). As the next subsection will reveal, there is not much in
to gleam from the survey data to help understand what may be causing the underbidding from a
behavioral standpoint. Notwithstanding the contributions in two bidder auctions, contributions
again were much higher on average than predicted in the six bidder auctions. The θ = 1
mechanism raised $27.12 US in six bidder auctions, where the average contribution is strikingly
similar to its two bidder counterpart. The WoA mechanism raised $23.64 US on average.
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What about participation in these mechanisms? In this chapter, “participating” in an auction will
be defined as making any positive contribution to the auction. This means different things in
different mechanisms. For instance, to participate in a θ = 0 auction, one need only choose a
positive endowment to have participated (and need not bid any of it). On the other hand, in a
θ = 1 auction, choosing a positive endowment is a necessary but not sufficient condition to
participate in an auction - one must also choose to bid at least one token of said endowment to
have participated. Figure 3-5 summarizes participation rates by mechanism. Reiterating their
equivalence, there should be no difference between participation rates in the All-pay and θ = 0
mechanisms. However, the results show that participation in the two bidder auctions is
statistically significantly greater in the θ = 0 mechanism (p < 0.032). This result may give some
insight into why the bucket auction typically performs so well: the incremental bidding design
encourages participation, perhaps because it is more interesting to bidders relative to submitting
a sealed, lump-sum bid.
Figure 3-5: Participation Rates

























Among the two bidder bucket auctions there is little variation in participation with
approximately 90% of bidders making some positive contribution. On the other hand, six bidder
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auctions see some variation in participation with a low of approximately 55% in the All-pay
mechanism to a high of approximately 70% in the θ = 0.5 mechanism. Participation rates in the
six bidder auctions are correlated with the average revenue across mechanisms. Furthermore, the
participation rates in the θ = 1 and WoA mechanisms are much greater than predicted. The
participation rates of these mechanisms are approximately 68% and 63% respectively. However,
all but two bidders should be willing to exit the auction before making any contribution, which
puts expected participation rates at 33% - a rate far below what is observed.
Finally, it is worth noting that for the bucket auctions the likelihood that a bidder won (i.e. did
not exit) the auction was significantly impacted by the position she had in circle. Namely, those
who were able to bid last intra-period were more likely to win an auction. These effects are
highlighted in Tables 3.7 and 3.8, which report probit estimates on bidder exits (exit=1) in two
and six bidder auctions respectively. The effect was relatively small in two bidder auctions,
where the bidder in position 2 won 55% of the time (as opposed to 50%). However, the benefit
become more exaggerated in the six bidder auctions, where the bidder in position 6 won 42% of
the time (as opposed to 17%).
3.4.3 Behavioral Factors
Following the completion of stage two, the auction portion of the experiment, subjects were
asked to respond to a thirteen question survey. This survey can be found in the appendix, and
many of the questions were identical to a subset of those in Carpenter (2010) (or only slightly
modified). Table 3.5 summarizes those questions that were used in the analysis of this subsection.
Subjects’ responses to these questions defined their individual characteristics in many
dimensions. One’s response to the measure labeled Competitive was based on a Likert scale (1-5)
of how competitive one views them self, where 1 indicated “Not at All” and 5 indicated “Very
82
Table 3.5: Summary of Survey Responses
Bidder Characteristics
All-pay θ = 0 θ = 0.5 θ = 1 WoA
Competitiveness (1-5) 3.83 4.21 4.08 4.29 4.17
Risk Response (1-5) 2.25 2.71 2.58 2.50 2.63
Loss Response (1-5) 4.29 4.00 4.46 4.04 4.33
Sunk Cost Response (0-1) 0.29 0.29 0.38 0.25 0.29
Subjects 24 24 24 24 24
Competitive”. The characteristic Risk Response indicated whether someone was willing to take
risks in financial situations where a 1 was not very likely and a 5 is very likely. Note that this
measure should not be conflated with the notion of risk aversion, as this survey question is not
an adequate measure of that. Instead, the interpretation of one’s response to this question can be
better understood as a more general attitude toward financial risks. The characteristic Loss
Response, which is also based on a Likert scale, measures how much an individual worries about
possible losses in financial situations where a 1 indicates that they do not at all and a 5 indicates
that they do very much. Finally, the characteristic labeled Sunk Cost Response measures one’s
sunk cost sensitivity. In the survey, subjects were given two hypothetical scenarios regarding
sunk costs and asked how they would behave, where their response was an indicator variable for
being sensitive to sunk costs. If a subject’s responses to these scenarios both indicated a sunk cost
sensitivity then they were labeled in the Table 3.5 as being sunk cost sensitive (1), otherwise they
were not labeled sunk cost sensitive (0).
Table 3.6 summarizes a series of ordinary least squares estimates of the sum of a subject’s
contributions from all twenty auctions. This aggregate measure of one’s contributions for the
entire experiment is regressed on each of the subject’s characteristics as measured by their survey
responses. Here, we can see the only characteristic that has a significant effect on the aggregate
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contributions a bidder made throughout the experiment is their risk response. In the All-pay and
θ = 0.5 mechanisms this effect is significant and positive, although only marginally so in the case
for All-pay.
Table 3.6: OLS Estimate of Survey Responses on Aggregate Contributions
Dependent Variable: Sum of All Contributions in $
Pooled All-pay θ = 0 θ = 0.5 θ = 1 WoA
Competitiveness 7.08 15.03 15.84 0.87 11.72 -21.55
(5.36) (11.71) (14.15) (13.81) (14.18) (15.06)
Risk Response 12.26∗∗∗ 24.86∗ 7.24 25.68∗∗ -3.29 -1.27
(4.45) (13.70) (10.43) (10.15) (11.11) (7.81)
Loss Response 5.31 -22.97 4.63 -4.06 17.50 -23.67
(5.84) (18.05) (10.33) (23.43) (11.70) (17.37)
Sunk Cost Response -8.42 28.20 -5.64 -29.33 0.72 -6.67
(10.47) (31.49) (27.43) (24.36) (22.73) (18.97)
Observations 120 24 24 24 24 24
Notes: clustered standard errors are in parentheses.
∗,∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
These subject-specific characteristics are also used to analyze the likelihood one exits in an
auction (i.e., whether or not they win or lose the auction). Tables 3.7 and 3.8 report of series of
probit estimates for each mechanism in two bidder and six bidder auctions respectively. Marginal
effects are reported. The variable Period is also included in these regressions, which measures
their relative placement in the bidding circle with 1 being first. In these regressions more nuanced
results appear that may speak to certain behavioral biases influencing their bidding strategies.
In the two bidder auctions, one’s bidding position had a significant effect on whether they chose
to exit. Namely, as one was able to bid later in the circle the more likely it was that they won the
auction. As was discussed in the previous subsection, this effect is even stronger in the six bidder
auctions. There was a strong effect from one’s competitiveness on the likelihood of one exiting an
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θ = 0 auction in the direction one would intuitively expect; more competitive individuals were
less likely to exit the auction. In the All-pay mechanism, bidders who were more likely to take
financial risks were also less likely to exit the auction (significant at the 5% level). Finally, there is
a very strong effect from one’s sunk cost sensitivity on the likelihood they will exit a WoA
auction; if someone is sunk cost sensitive they are less likely to exit the auction. This result
corroborates that of Carpenter et al. (2013) where one’s sunk cost sensitivity was also found to
increase the duration one stayed in the auction.
Table 3.7: Probit Estimate of Auction Exits on Survey Responses in 2 Bidder Auctions
Dependent Variable: Exited (Lost) the Auction (1=Exit)
Pooled All-pay θ = 0 θ = 0.5 θ = 1 WoA
Position -0.09∗ 0.03 0.04 0.06 -0.18∗∗∗ -0.37∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.02) (0.13)
Competitiveness -0.05∗ -0.02 -0.17∗∗∗ 0.03 -0.03 -0.03
(0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.08) (0.04)
Risk Response -0.06∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗ 0.03 -0.07 -0.05 -0.01
(0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.07) (0.03)
Loss Response -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.14∗ -0.08 -0.1
(0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10)
Sunk Cost Response 0.01 0.06 -0.02 0.09 0.06 -0.27∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.13) (0.09) (0.16) (0.05) (0.04)
Observations 1200 240 240 240 240 240
Notes: clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Marginal effects are reported.
∗,∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
In the six bidder auctions, many of the measured characteristics have more exaggerate effects
relative to the two bidder auctions. For instance, while one’s competitiveness was the only
characteristic that positively influenced the likelihood a bidder won for the two bidder θ = 0
auction, this characteristic also had a positive effect in the All-pay, θ = 0 and θ = 1 mechanisms
for six bidder auctions. One’s willingness to take financial risks also increases the likelihood they
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won the six bidder All-pay, θ = 0 and θ = 0.5 auctions. Because these are the auctions that require
some upfront cost to participate, this result suggests that bidders correctly perceived most of the
risk in these auctions was in the endowment stage. The more worried bidders became about
potential losses the more likely they were to exit the six bidder All-pay and θ = 0.5 auctions.
Finally, there is a strong effect of one’s sunk cost sensitivity on the likelihood they won the six
bidder θ = 0.5 auctions. Interestingly, the effect is strongly in the opposite direction of that found
in the two bidder auctions for the WoA mechanism and for previous studies.
Table 3.8: Probit Estimate of Auction Exits on Survey Responses in 6 Bidder Auctions
Dependent Variable: Exited (Lost) the Auction (1=Exit)
Pooled All-pay θ = 0 θ = 0.5 θ = 1 WoA
Position -0.05∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗† -0.02∗∗∗ -0.04 -0.11∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04)
Competitiveness -0.04∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ 0.02 -0.09∗∗∗ -0.03
(0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03)
Risk Response -0.03∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ 0.03 -0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Loss Response 0.00 0.10∗∗∗ -0.02 0.10∗∗ -0.02 0.05
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05)
Sunk Cost Response 0.02 -0.13 -0.02 0.17∗∗∗ -0.03 0.06
(0.04) (0.13) (0.16) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08)
Observations 1200 240 240 240 240 240
Notes: clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Marginal effects are reported.
∗,∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
† This significance in Period for All-pay is due to how the computer broke ties




This chapter adds to a growing literature on the ability of all-pay auctions to raise money for
charity. The theoretical literature on charity auction design uniformly touts the superior
fund-raising capacity of all-pay auctions, as they eliminate the free-riding associated with
winner-pay auctions. In winner-pay auctions, losing bidders accrue benefits proportional to the
winning bid at a cost of zero, and this subsequently suppresses bids. Among the empirical
evidence on all-pay auctions for charity, however, there are mixed results regarding their ability
to generate contributions as predicted. The inconsistency of the all-pay auction can largely be
traced back to participation rates.
Given that participation rates typically constrain all-pay auctions from reaching their theoretical
potential with respect to revenue, an all-pay mechanism that theoretically requires relatively little
participation among potential bidders may help stabilize all-pay revenues. This led to the
consideration of the “bucket auction,” which is essentially a war of attrition. Theoretically, this
mechanism requires at most two bidders to participate if the auctioned item has a pure common
value. Moreover, Carpenter et al. (2013) shows that the bucket auction should raise more than a
first price all-pay auction in expectation, which also increases its desirability as the preferred
mechanism. Furthermore, they show that the bucket auction performs extraordinarily well
relative to the first price all-pay auction.
This chapter builds from Carpenter et al. (2013) to address the bidder-specific and
mechanism-specific characteristics of the bucket auction that may be leading to its overwhelming
success. This is done through an innovative theoretical model that bridges the gap between the
first price all-pay auction and the second price all-pay auction (i.e., the war of attrition). Charity
auctions are induced in the laboratory to test the performance of the first price all-pay auction
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alongside several variations of the bucket auction.
One of the primary experimental findings of this chapter is the “bucket premium,” which
identifies that an incremental bidding mechanism like the bucket auction can statistically
significantly increase contributions beyond their theoretical predictions. Moreover, there is no
such benefit from a lump-sum bidding mechanism like the first price all-pay auction. Exit survey
data suggests that the bucket auction is capable of raising contributions by exploiting the
bidders’ degree of competitiveness better than the first price all-pay auction.
Contrary to our theoretical understanding that the bucket auction only requires two bidders in a
pure common value setting, the experiments of this study reveal that contributions are not
sufficient enough in this setting to generate the level of revenue theoretically predicted by the
traditional war of attrition. However, in the presence of six bidders, contributions are much more
than sufficient to generate the revenue theoretically predicted - even after a reasonable amount of
exposure to the mechanism with six potential bidders. While this study fails to support the
bucket auction’s ability to perform well in the presence of very few bidders, it does continue to
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A Putting Social Preferences to Work
A.0.1 Subject Directions
You have been asked to participate in an economics experiment. In addition to the $5 dollars you
will receive for showing up today, you may earn an additional amount of money, which will be
paid to you at the end of the experiment.
In today’s experiment the computer will randomly place you in one of two roles for the entire
study, either Role A or Role B.
There will be several rounds of decision making, each of which consists of 3 parts.
In the first part of each round, each person in Role A will be asked to make a decision about how
money will be allocated between him/herself and a randomly selected person in Role B. You will
not know who this other person is, and he or she will not know who you are at any point either
during or after the experiment. The person in Role A will be presented with 2 options of how to
split the money, and they will be labeled "Option A" and "Option B". These options will be
different in each round.
People in Role B will be asked to make hypothetical decisions at the same time, but the choice
made by those in Role B will not influence anyone’s payout. On the next screen you will be told
which Role you are in.
You will be in Role A (B) for the entire experiment.
This means that you will be making real (hypothetical) payout decisions for you and another
person here in Role B (A).
In the 2nd part of each round, each person in Role A will be presented with an alternative to the
option he or she chose in part 1.
The alternative way of splitting the money is randomly generated by the computer, and will be
labeled "Alternative".
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Ultimately, whether the money is split via Role A’s choice in part 1 or via the Alternative
generated by the computer in part 2 will depend on Role A’s performance in part 3 of the round.
In part 3 of each round Role A will be asked to complete a task.
Role A’s performance of this task will determine which allocation option (Role A’s choice from
part 1 or the alternative generated by the computer in part 2) will be used to split the money
between Role A and the other person in Role B.
If the person in Role A successfully completes the task, the option he or she chose in part 1 will
be used to split the money.
If the Person in Role A fails at the task, the alternative generated by the computer in part 2 will be
used to split the money.
Instructions for this task are provided on the next screen.
Instructions for the task are as follows:
Role A will be shown a sequence of 120 random characters consisting of numbers (0-9) and
letters (A-Z). The task is to count how many numbers (0-9) there are in the 120 characters. Role A
will have 90 seconds to complete this task. The Option Role A chose in Part 1 will determine the
payout if he or she counted how many numbers are in the sequence correctly within 1. In other
words, Role A can still be off by 1 and still keep the Option he or she chose in Part 1. Otherwise,
the payout will be determined by the Alternative.
After Role A has completed the task in part 3, the computer will tell Role A whether he or she
succeeded or failed at the task, and the computer will also tell Role A how the money was split.
This will be the case for every round.
At the end of the experiment, the computer will randomly choose one of these allocation
decisions to determine the payouts for the person in Role A and the person in Role B.
Just to recap, the experiment involves several rounds in which:
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1. Role A will choose between 2 options for how money will be split between
him/herself and someone in Role B. Role B will choose between 2 hypothetical
options of how to split money. The decisions by those in Role B will not influence
anyone’s payouts.
2. Those is Role A will be presented with a randomly generated alternative to the
option he/she chose in part 1.
3. Those in Role A will complete a counting task, where successfully completing the
task will cause the money to be split according to the option he/she chose in part 1
and failing the task will cause the money to be split according to the alternative
generated by the computer in part 2.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will come over to your
computer station. If you fully and completely understand these directions, please click the button
that says BEGIN to start a PRACTICE round.
We are now ready to begin the experiment. If you have any questions, please feel free to ask them
now. Otherwise, please click the button that says "BEGIN" to start the experiment.
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A.0.2 Screenshots
Dictator chooses between Option A and Option B:
Dictator is shown their choice and the alternative (in this case, A):
Dictator is shown their choice and the alternative (in this case, B):
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Dictator is shown their choice and the alternative (in this case, C):
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Dictator is shown their choice and the alternative (in this case, D):
Dictator completes the effort task:
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Dictator is shown the result of their effort task:
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B Bidder Behavior in All-pay Auctions for Charity
B.0.4 Subject Directions for the Bucket Auction
Welcome! You have already earned $5 for showing up on time. It is important that you read
these instructions carefully and understand them, so that you can make good decisions, and
potentially make a considerable amount of money today.
If you have any questions during the experiment, please raise your hand, and an experimenter
will come to assist you. Otherwise, please do not talk or communicate with anyone.
Overview:
This experiment has two phases, each of which involves a repeated activity.
Phase 1: In this phase all participants here today will have multiple opportunities to
complete a task. Each time you complete the task successfully you will earn $2. If you
do not complete the task successfully you will earn $0.
Phase 2: In this phase all participants here today will have multiple opportunities to
participate in an auction. The item being auctioned is a fictitious item worth $10. At
first, each of you will be randomly and anonymously matched with one other bidder
(participant in this experiment) for each auction. Later, each of you will be randomly
and anonymously matched with five other bidders for each auction. However, only
one of you may claim the $10 item in a given auction.
Phase 1: The Task
Instructions for the task are as follows:
You will be shown a sequence of 120 random characters consisting of numbers (0-9) and letters
(A-Z). The task is to count how many numbers (0-9) there are in the 120 characters. You will have
60 seconds to complete this task and report the number to the computer.
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If you count how many numbers are in the sequence correctly within 3 then you will receive $2.
In other words, you can be off by at most 3 (over or under) and still receive $2.
To the left is an example of the task in Phase 1 [shown on screen]. Take a moment to see what this
task is like. (The "REPORT" button does not work right now because this is just an example.)
Hint: in this example there are [actual] numbers. If you had reported [actual-3], [actual-2], [actual-1],
[actual], [actual+1], [actual+2] or [actual+3] you would have received $2.
Note that zeros (0) and Os look very similar. Because the example here was randomly generated,
it may or may not have zeros or Os.
Phase 2: The Auction
In Phase 2 you will have the opportunity to participate in auctions using the money you earned
in Phase 1.
To participate in an auction you must have Tokens. Tokens can be purchased, using the money
you earned in Phase 1, for $0.50 each before the auction begins. You cannot buy more tokens than
you can afford, and you cannot buy tokens once the auction begins.
Bidders will take turns Bidding (i.e. contributing) their Tokens, one Token at a time. The last
bidder to Bid a Token will claim the auctioned item, which is a fictitious item worth $10.
If at any point you prefer to not Bid, you may choose to Exit, and forfeit the auction. If you
choose to Exit you will not claim the item. A bidder can claim the item only if they are the last to
Bid (at least one) Token. If, when the auction ends, you have Tokens left over, these Tokens will
be redeemed for $0.25 each.
Important Aspects of this Auction:
1. Each auction you will be randomly and anonymously matched with 1 or 5 other
participants for the auction. So, you will never know who the other bidders are.
2. No one will ever know how many Tokens you buy, and you will not know how many
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Tokens other bidders buy.
3. Tokens are purchased at the beginning of each auction only, and cannot be transferred from
one auction to the next.
4. One of you will be randomly chosen to start bidding. This will be revealed after all bidders
have bought their Tokens and has nothing to do with how many Tokens were purchased.
5. You may choose to buy 0 Tokens at no cost, if you like.
6. If no one chooses to Bid a Token, then no one will claim the item.
7. If only one bidder chooses to buy Tokens, then that bidder will claim the item by bidding
their first Token.
Bidders’ endowments will be reset to the amount they earned in Phase 1 at the beginning of each new
auction. As a result, the decision to participate in an auction does not impact a bidder’s ability to
participate in future auctions.
Important Aspects of this Auction:
Furthermore, in these auctions we will be simulating charity auctions. Charity auctions are
different in two ways, both of which will impact how much money you earn. These two ways are
outlined here:
1. In charity auctions, bidders often receive benefits from how much revenue is raised (i.e.
how many Tokens are contributed by all bidders combined).
2. Bidders often feel good for contributing to a charity.
The auction raises revenue through the total value of Tokens that were Bid by everyone in the
auction and the unredeemable value of unused Tokens.
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Because bidders often receive benefits from the total revenue raised, for every $1 the auction
raises in revenue the bidders in that auction will receive $0.10 each. Example: if all bidders
combined contribute $15 to the auction, then each of them would receive $1.50 at the end of the auction.
Because individual bidders feel good for contributing to charity, for every $1 you personally
contribute to the auction, you will receive $0.05. Example: if you contribute $6 to the auction (i.e. 12
Tokens), then you would receive $0.30 at the end of the auction on top of any money received because of the
total amount raised.
Summary of the Auction
To recap, in each auction of Phase 2 you will be placed in an auction where,
1. Each period you will be randomly and anonymously paired with one or five other
participants(s) for the auction. So, you will never know the other bidders.
2. All bidders will privately buy Tokens for the auction using the money earned in Phase 1.
3. One bidder will be randomly chosen to start bidding.
4. The last person to contribute a Token will claim the fictitious item worth $10.
5. Each of you, regardless of winning or losing the auction, will earn an additional $0.10 for
each $1 of revenue generated by all bidders.
6. Each of you, regardless of winning or losing the auction, will earn an additional $0.05 for
each $1 personally contributed to the auction.
As mentioned earlier, there will be many opportunities for you to participate in an auction. At
the end of the experiment, the computer will choose one of these auctions randomly. Your
payment for Phase 2 will be based on the outcome of this one randomly selected auction.
Almost Ready to Begin
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Your total earnings for today’s experiment will consist of your cumulative earnings from Phase 1,
your earnings from one randomly selected auction in Phase 2, and your $5 show up payment for
coming on time. So:
Total Earnings =
Phase 1 Earnings +
Phase 2 Earnings +
Show Up Payment ($5)
If you have any questions you would like to ask at this point, please raise your hand. Otherwise,
you will now go through a series of comprehension questions to make sure you understand the
experiment. After everyone has correctly answered these questions, there will be one practice
auction, then Phase 1 will begin.
Comprehension Questions
1. True or False: The other bidders in my auction are the same every period.
(a) True.
(b) False. [A: Bidders are randomly assigned to auctions each time.]
2. True or False: You must buy Tokens for every auction.
(a) True.
(b) False. [A: You can choose to not participate in an auction by not buying any Tokens.]
3. True or False: You won’t know who will bid first when you buy your Tokens.




4. True or False: If you choose not to buy any Tokens you cannot win the auction, but you
will not use any money you earned in Phase 1.
(a) True. [A: If you don’t buy any Tokens, you cannot win the auction and you will not use
any money you earned in Phase 1.]
(b) False.
5. True or False: Your earnings for Phase 2 will be based on one randomly selected auction.
(a) True. [A: One auction will be randomly selected, and the outcome of this auction will
determine your earnings for Phase 2.]
(b) False.
[At the beginning of Period 11]
The number of bidders in each auction has increased to 6! Bidders are still randomly assigned to
auctions. (Everything else about the auction is the same.)
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B.0.5 Exit Survey
The experiment is now over. Thank you for participating! Below, there are a few questions that
will help us understand the decisions you’ve made in this experiment. Please give them your full
consideration.
How difficult did you find this auction?
Very Easy Easy Moderate Hard Very Hard
    
Briefly, explain what your strategy was for bidding. [open response]
How many auctions have you participated in over the last 2 years (including online auctions like
eBay)? [numerical response]
How fair is this auction to bidders?
Very Unfair Unfair Neither Fair Nor Unfair Fair Very Fair
    
If present at a charity auction like this in the future, how likely would you be to participate?
Very Unlikely Unlikely Neither Likely Nor Unlikely Likely Very Likely
    
We would like to ask you a few questions about your preferences and attitudes. Please try to
answer these as accurately as possible.
In general, do you see yourself as someone who is willing to take risks?
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree Nor Disagree Agree Strongly Agree
    
Financially, do you see yourself as someone who is willing to take risks?
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree Nor Disagree Agree Strongly Agree
    
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In general, when you are faced with an uncertain situation, do you worry a lot about possible
losses?
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree Nor Disagree Agree Strongly Agree
    
In financial situations, when you are faced with an uncertain situation, do you worry a lot about
possible losses?
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree Nor Disagree Agree Strongly Agree
    
In general, how competitive are you?
Not at All Usually I Am Not Undecided Usually I Am Very Competitive
    
We would like to ask you a few hypothetical questions. Please try to answer these as accurately
as possible.
Imagine that you’ve decided to see a movie in town and have purchased a $10 ticket. As you’re
waiting outside the theater for a friend to join you, you discover that you’ve lost the ticket. The
seats are not marked and the ticket cannot be recovered because the person who sold it doesn’t
remember you. Would you buy another $10 ticket? [Response: Yes or No]
Imagine that a month ago, you and a friend made a nonrefundable $100 deposit on a hotel room
in New Orleans for the coming weekend. Since the reservation was made, however, the two of
you have been invited to spend the same weekend at another friend’s cabin in Colorado. You’d
both prefer to spend the weekend at the cabin but if you don’t go to New Orleans, the $100
deposit will be lost. Would you still go to New Orleans? [Response: Yes or No]
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